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SET THEORY FOR CATEGORY THEORY
MICHAEL A. SHULMAN
Abstract. Questions of set-theoretic size play an essential role in category
theory, especially the distinction between sets and proper classes (or small sets
and large sets). There are many different ways to formalize this, and which
choice is made can have noticeable effects on what categorical constructions
are permissible. In this expository paper we summarize and compare a num-
ber of such “set-theoretic foundations for category theory,” and describe their
implications for the everyday use of category theory. We assume the reader
has some basic knowledge of category theory, but little or no prior experience
with formal logic or set theory.
1. Introduction
Since its earliest days, category theory has had to deal with set-theoretic ques-
tions. This is because unlike in most fields of mathematics outside of set theory,
questions of size play an essential role in category theory.
A good example is Freyd’s Special Adjoint Functor Theorem: a functor from
a complete, locally small, and well-powered category with a cogenerating set to a
locally small category has a left adjoint if and only if it preserves small limits. This
is always one of the first results I quote when people ask me “are there any real
theorems in category theory?” So it is all the more striking that it involves in an
essential way notions like ‘locally small’, ‘small limits’, and ‘cogenerating set’ which
refer explicitly to the difference between sets and proper classes (or between small
sets and large sets).
Despite this, in my experience there is a certain amount of confusion among users
and students of category theory about its foundations, and in particular about what
constructions on large categories are or are not possible. Most introductory category
theory books and courses quite rightly ignore deeper set-theoretic questions, which
will only confuse most beginners. However, intermediate and advanced students of
category theory may naturally begin to wonder about these questions.
It turns out that there are several possible foundational choices for category
theory, and which choice is made can have noticeable effects on what is possible
and what is not. The purpose of this informal paper is to summarize and compare
some of these proposed foundations, including both ‘set-theoretical’ and ‘category-
theoretical’ ones, and describe their implications for the everyday use of category
theory. I assume the reader has some basic knowledge of category theory, such as
can be obtained from [ML98] or [Awo06], but little or no experience with formal
logic or set theory. I found some brief excursions into mathematical logic unavoid-
able, but I have tried to explain all logical notions as they occur and relegate the
more complicated logical discussion to footnotes.
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Related papers include [Fef69, Appendix II] (by G. Kreisel) and [Bla84]; a his-
torical survey can be found in [Kro¨07]. Since my goal is expository, I have tried to
restrict citations to those most useful for the student, when such exist. Likewise,
this is not a history paper, so I will concentrate on current understanding.
Finally, this is a work in progress, so suggested corrections and improvements,
both in mathematical content and exposition, are extremely welcome. Please also
let me know if you have suggestions for other references to include. Numerous
people have already helped me with editing and feedback; I would like to especially
thank Damir Dzhafarov and Kenny Easwaran for useful discussions about set theory
and foundations; Antonio Montalban for explaining why the reflection principle
doesn’t violate the incompleteness theorem; Peter Lumsdaine for pointing out that
a transitive set model without full power sets can be countable; and Colin McLarty
for directing my attention to the categorical replacement axiom.
2. Size does matter
Before diving into set theory, it’s natural to wonder why we need to worry about
size issues at all. In this section I’ll review two theorems of basic category theory
(interestingly, both due to Peter Freyd) which, I think, display the essential nature
of size considerations. Since this section is just motivation, I’ll be vague about the
exact meaning of ‘set’, ‘class’, ‘small’, and ‘large’, assuming the reader has some
familiarity with their use.
First of all, we say that a category is complete if it admits all limits indexed
by small categories ; that is, categories with only a set of objects and a set of
morphisms. The basic example of a complete category is Set: if A is small and
F : A → Set is a functor, then the limit set lim(F ) consists of families (xa)a∈A
such that xa ∈ Fa and for all f : a → b in A, Ff(xa) = xb. There is the dual
notion of cocomplete.
It is essential in giving this definition that we restrict to small limits, since there
are many large limits that Set does not admit. For example, if X is a set with
more than one element, then the A-fold product
∏
a∈AX exists if A is any set, but
not if A is a proper class. More generally, we have the following, which is our first
theorem in which size considerations are essential.
Theorem 2.1. If a category A has products indexed by the collection Arr(A) of
arrows in A, then A is a preorder. In particular, any small complete category is a
preorder, and no large category that is not a preorder can admit products indexed
by proper classes.
Proof. Suppose that we had two different arrows f, g : a→ b, and form the product∏
Arr(A) b. Then f and g give us 2
|Arr(A)| different arrows a→
∏
Arr(A) b; but there
are only |Arr(A)| total arrows in A, a contradiction.1 
Thus, in order to capture most interesting examples, the notion of complete
category must allow large categories, but restrict to small limits.
However, many large categories do admit some large limits. For example, most
large categories admit an intersection for any family of monomorphisms with com-
mon codomain, no matter how large. This is usually, but not always, because
1The use of proof by contradiction in this argument is essential. In intuitionistic logic the
theorem can fail; see [Hyl88] or [McL92a, Ch. 24].
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the category is well-powered, meaning that each object has only a set of iso-
morphism classes of subobjects. Other large limits also often exist; see, for exam-
ple, [Kel86, KK81].
Well-poweredness figures prominently in our second example: the Special Adjoint
Functor Theorem. Recall that a family Q of objects in a category A is said to be
cogenerating if whenever f 6= g : a ⇉ b are unequal parallel arrows, there exists
an arrow h : b → q with q ∈ Q such that hf 6= hg. We are usually only interested
in this when Q is a set. Recall also that a category A is locally small if for any
objects a, b the collection of morphisms A(a, b) is a set.
Theorem 2.2. If A is locally small, complete, well-powered and has a cogenerating
set, and B is locally small, then a functor G : A→ B has a left adjoint if and only
if it preserves small limits.
Proof. It suffices to construct, for each b ∈ B, an arrow b→ GFb, for some object
Fb ∈ A, which is initial among arrows b → Ga. To define Fb, we first form the
product p =
∏
q∈Q
∏
B(b,Gq) q in A. This product exists since Q is a set, B is locally
small, and A is complete. Since G preserves products, we have an induced map
b → Gp. Now let Fb be the intersection of all monomorphisms a ֌ p such that
b→ Gp factors through Ga→ Gp. This intersection exists since A is well-powered
and complete. Since G preserves monomorphisms and intersections, we have an
induced map b→ GFb. We leave it to the reader to verify that this has the desired
universal property (or see [ML98, V.8]). 
For example, if A satisfies the hypotheses of the theorem and C is any small
category, then the functor category [C,A] is locally small and the diagonal functor
∆: A→ [C,A] preserves limits, hence has a left adjoint. Thus any such A is also
cocomplete.
Of course, as pointed out in the introduction, size distinctions play an essential
role in this theorem. As stated, it applies to small categories just as well as large
ones, but it becomes somewhat degenerate: any small category is locally small,
well-powered, and has a cogenerating set, so we obtain the following.
Corollary 2.3. If A is a complete lattice and G : A→ B preserves greatest lower
bounds, then it has a left adjoint.
While undoubtedly important, this result is only a pale shadow of the full Adjoint
Functor Theorem. Moreover, the Adjoint Functor Theorem is not just a bit of fluff;
there are examples even outside of pure category theory where it is the only known
way to construct an adjoint. So, like it or not, we are forced to deal with the
question of size in category theory.
3. ZFC
With that motivation under our belts, we now turn to a quick summary of set
theory. A natural question to begin with is: what is a set? One modern answer is
that sets are special sorts of collections, which can be manipulated in well-defined
ways that
(a) suffice for applications in mathematics, but
(b) are not powerful enough to reproduce the well-known paradoxes.
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There are three classical paradoxes of set theory, traditionally known as Russell’s,
Cantor’s, and Burali-Forti’s.2 Russell’s paradox is non-categorical in flavor, while
Burali-Forti’s requires ordinal numbers (see Theorem 7.3), so here we recall only
Cantor’s.
Theorem 3.1. There is no set containing all sets as members.
Proof. Suppose that V were such a set. Then every subset of V , being a set, would
be a member of V ; thus PV ⊂ V and so |PV | ≤ |V |, contradicting Cantor’s proof
by diagonalization that |A| < |PA| for any A. 
Thus, if we want to manipulate sets in the intuitive ways we are used to, there
must be some limitation on what collections we are allowed to call ‘sets’. The
modern solution is to use a system of axioms which allows us to construct enough
sets to do mathematics, but not to construct problematic sets such as V .
The set-theoretic axioms which have come to be accepted as standard are today
called ZFC (Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice) and can be found
in any book on set theory (I like [Dev93, End77] as introductions, while [Jec03] is
encyclopedic) or on the Internet. For later reference, we divide the axioms of zfc
into four types.
(i) The basic axioms: extensionality, foundation (or regularity), pairing, union,
empty set, and separation.
(ii) The size-increasing axioms: replacement and power set.
(iii) The size-assertion axiom: infinity.
(iv) The axiom of choice.
Most of these are well-known or obvious. The axiom schema of separation states
that for any set A and any definable property ϕ(x), the set {x ∈ A | ϕ(x)} exists.
The axiom schema of replacement states that for any set A and any definable
property ϕ(x, y) such that for any x ∈ A, there is a unique y with ϕ(x, y), the
set {y | ∃x ∈ A ϕ(x, y)} exists. These are both both axiom schemas : there is
one separation axiom for each definable property ϕ and one replacement axiom for
each definable and ‘functional’ property ϕ. In the presence of the other axioms, the
replacement schema implies the separation schema.
To be precise, definable here means ‘definable in the formal first-order language
of set theory’. But don’t worry if you don’t know any logic; this really just means
that it can be described in ordinary mathematical language, referring only to sets
or things that can be defined in terms of sets (which includes most of mathematics).
For example, ‘x is a continuous function from R to R’ is a definable property of x,
so separation allows us to form the set of all such functions (taking, A to be, say,
the power set of R× R).
All the ordinary constructions of mathematics can be performed using these
axioms. For instance, we can define the ordered pair (a, b) as the set {{a}, {a, b}},
which exists by pairing, and the cartesian product A×B as
A×B =
{
z ∈ P
(
P(A ∪B)
) ∣∣∣ ∃ a ∈ A : ∃ b ∈ B : z = (a, b)
}
,
2Cesare Burali-Forti (1861–1931) is one of those mathematicians who are easily mistaken for
two people by the unwary student. Other distinguished members of this club include Tullio
Levi-Civita (1873–1941) and Go¨sta Mittag-Leffler (1846–1927).
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which exists by power-set and separation. Similarly, the set BA of functions from
A to B can be defined by
BA =
{
f ∈ P(A×B)
∣∣∣ ∀ a ∈ A : ∃ ! b ∈ B : (a, b) ∈ f
}
.
Let me comment briefly on the axiom schema of replacement, which may seem
the strangest one in the list from a categorical point of view. In particular, it may
seem odd to call it a size-increasing axiom, since it merely replaces a set by an
isomorphic one, or at most a quotient. We will see in later sections that given
the other (also non-categorical) axioms of zfc, replacement in fact allows us to
construct much larger sets than would otherwise be possible. But we will also
see that above and beyond this, replacement plays a subtle and important role in
category theory—so much so that this paper could easily have been subtitled “a
tale of the replacement axiom”!
Remark 3.2. The approach of zfc, and its relatives to be described in later sections,
is not the only way to avoid paradoxes in set theory. For example, in NFU (New
Foundations with Urelements), any collection of things characterized by a ‘stratified’
property is a set. This allows for the existence of an actual set of all sets, while
still avoiding paradoxes; see [Hol98] for a good introduction. However, nfu is not
much good for category theory, since the category Set it produces is not cartesian
closed [McL92b].
4. Ordinals and cardinals
We now briefly review the theory of ordinal and cardinal numbers. Succinctly,
a cardinal number is a canonically chosen representative for a bijection class
of sets, while an ordinal number is a canonically chosen representative for an
isomorphism class of well-ordered sets. Here a well-ordering on a set is a total
ordering such that every nonempty subset has a least element. The ordinals have
the following properties.
(i) Every ordinal α has an immediate successor α+1, obtained by adding an
extra element at the end of a well-ordering of type α.
(ii) There is a natural well-ordering on the collection of all ordinals: α ≤ β iff
α is isomorphic to an initial segment of β.
(iii) The induced well-ordering on {β : β < α} is in the isomorphism class
represented by α.
(iv) Every set is well-orderable, and hence bijective to some ordinal (this is
equivalent to the axiom of choice).
Because of (iii), one definition of an ordinal number (due to von Neumann) is as
the set of all smaller ordinals. Thus, the ordinals begin with the natural numbers
0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, and so on, but continue afterwards with
ω, ω + 1, . . . , ω · 2, . . . , ω · 3, . . . , ω2, . . . , ω3, . . . , ωω, . . . , ωω
ω
, . . . , ωω
ω
, . . .
We note in passing that the replacement axioms are first necessary to construct
ω · 2 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, . . . }. Without replacement, we can construct
each ordinal ω + n, but we cannot collect them all as elements of a single set. We
can construct well-ordered sets isomorphic to ω · 2 without replacement, however,
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so the von Neumann definition of an ordinal is only appropriate in the presence of
replacement.
All the ordinals listed above are countable (bijective with ω). We denote the
first uncountable ordinal by ω1, the next ordinal not bijective with ω1 by ω2, and
so on. In fact, we can define a cardinal number to be an ordinal not bijective with
any smaller ordinal. It follows that the cardinal numbers are also well-ordered, and
can be indexed by the ordinal numbers. We write ℵα for the αth cardinal number;
thus ℵ0 = ω, ℵ1 = ω1, and so on. Every set X is bijective to a unique cardinal |X |,
called its cardinality. If κ is a cardinal, we write 2κ for |Pκ|.
There are two types of ordinals. Those of the form α+ 1, for some α, are called
successor ordinals, while the rest are called limit ordinals. Every cardinal is a
limit ordinal. A cardinal is a successor cardinal or a limit cardinal just when
its indexing ordinal is a successor or limit ordinal.
Just as the well-ordering of N justifies the usual sort of mathematical induction,
the well-ordering of ordinals justifies definition and proof by transfinite induc-
tion. This involves proving or constructing something in stages, one for each ordi-
nal. The two cases of successor ordinals and limit ordinals are usually dealt with
differently; for α+ 1 we base the construction on α, while for a limit ordinal β we
base it on all other ordinals α < β. We consider several important examples, three
from set theory and one from category theory.
Example 4.1. The definition of the alephs can be phrased as a transfinite induction:
we set ℵ0 = ω, let ℵα+1 be the smallest cardinal greater than ℵα, and for a limit β
we let ℵβ = limα<β ℵα.
Similarly, we define i0 = ω, iα+1 = 2
iα , and iβ = limα<β iα. The Generalized
Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is equivalent to ℵα = iα for all α.
Example 4.2. Define a set Vα for each ordinal α by transfinite induction as follows.
V0 = ∅
Vα+1 = PVα
Vβ =
⋃
α<β
Vα (β a limit).
The sets Vα are called the cumulative hierarchy. The axiom of foundation is
equivalent to the assertion that every set is in Vα for some α; this is often phrased
as V =
⋃
Vα, even though the class V of all sets is not itself a set.
The rank of a set X is the smallest α such that X ∈ Vα. For instance, the
rank of each ordinal α is α + 1. Most ordinary mathematical objects, as usually
constructed from sets, have very low rank: the rank of N = ω is ω + 1, the rank of
Z is ω + 2, the rank of Q is ω + 5, and the rank of R is ω + 9 (or even less, if we
are sufficiently clever).
Example 4.3. For any set X , let Def(X) denote the set of all subsets of X which are
definable from elements of X . By this I mean all sets of the form {x ∈ X | ϕ(x)}
for some definable property ϕ(x) which refers only to elements of X—that is, its
parameters and quantifiers (“for all y” or “there exists y”) range only over elements
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of X . We define sets Lα by transfinite induction as follows.
L0 = ∅
Lα+1 = Def(Lα)
Lβ =
⋃
α<β
Lα (β a limit).
The sets Lα are called the constructible hierarchy and the class L =
⋃
Lα is called
the constructible universe. The axiom of constructibility is the assertion that V = L;
that is, that every set is constructible. (Note that this does not mean Vα = Lα!)
Most set theorists do not believe this axiom is ‘true’, because it is so restrictive
about what sets exist, but it cannot be proven or disproven from zfc alone, though
it does contradict some large cardinal axioms (see §9).
Example 4.4. Let A be a cocomplete category and S be a pointed endofunctor,
meaning a functor S : A→ A equipped with a natural transformation σ : IdA → S.
For any objectX ∈ A we define a sequence of objects Xα, together with morphisms
Xγ → Xα for γ < α, by transfinite induction as follows.
X0 = X
Xα+1 = SXα
Xβ = colimα<β Xα (β a limit).
The colimit at limit ordinals is, of course, over the diagram formed by the mor-
phisms Xγ → Xα, which we define by a parallel transfinite induction. Namely, at
a successor stage each morphism Xγ → Xα+1 is the composite
Xγ −→ Xα
σ
−→ SXα = Xα+1,
while at a limit stage the morphisms Xγ → Xβ are just the colimit cocone.
If for some ordinal δ, the maps Xγ → Xα are isomorphisms for all δ < γ < α,
we say that this process converges. The intuition is that this happens when SX
is defined from X by a ‘small amount of data’, since then for a large enough limit
ordinal α, all the data necessary to construct SXα will be contained in the objects
Xγ for γ < α, so we will have SXα ∼= Xα. Converging sequences of this sort are
often used to construct reflections for subcategories and colimits in categories of
algebras; an encyclopedic reference is [Kel80, Kel82].
A similar procedure is often followed in homotopy theory, but in this case usually
we instead want the maps Xγ → Xα to become ‘weak equivalences’ in an appro-
priate sense. For example, if A is the category of topological spaces and ‘weak
equivalence’ means ‘weak homotopy equivalence’ (that is, a map inducing isomor-
phisms on all homotopy groups), then it usually suffices to take δ = ω. This is
because homotopy groups are detected by maps out of spheres, but spheres are
compact, and so a map from a sphere into a well-behaved sequential colimit must
factor through some finite stage. However, in more complicated arguments, very
large values of δ may be necessary. In homotopy theory this is called the small
object argument, because it relies on the ‘smallness’ of objects like spheres; see, for
instance, [Hov99]. For a version of the small object argument which does converge
in the category-theoretic sense, see [Gar].
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5. Logic and Incompleteness
A common mistake is to regard the axioms of zfc as assertions only about ‘the
real’ universe of sets, when in fact they are satisfied by many different ‘universes of
sets’. This is not a philosophical statement, but a mathematical one. The reader is
free to entertain a Platonic belief that a ‘real’ universe of sets exists (as many set
theorists seem to do), but it will still be true that the axioms of zfc support many
different models in addition to this ‘real’ one. To clarify the situation it is helpful
to consider an analogy.
The axioms of group theory are the following; they deal with a collection of
things and a binary operation “·”.
• For all x, y, z we have x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z.
• There exists an e such that for all x, we have x · e = x = e · x.
• For all x, there exists a y such that x · y = e = y · x.
A model of these axioms is a collection of things with a binary operation satisfying
them. Of course, this is just a group. We can prove theorems from the axioms,
which will then be true statements about any group. However, some statements,
like “for all x and y, x · y = y · x”, are neither provable nor disprovable from the
axioms; these are true for some groups and false for others.
In fact, Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem says that if a statement is unprovable
from the axioms of a theory T , then there exist some models of the theory in which
it is true and others in which it is false. We say that a theory is consistent if
its axioms do not imply a contradiction; the completeness theorem can then be
rephrased as “any consistent theory has a model”. Conversely, the rather more
obvious Soundness Theorem says that any theory with a model is consistent.
Now, the axioms of zfc, which we summarized in §3, deal with a collection of
things and a binary relation ∈. A model of the axioms of set theory is a collection
of things, which we usually call sets3, together with a binary relation ∈, usually
called membership, which satisfy the axioms. Let us call such a model a universe.
We can prove many theorems from zfc (in fact, we can develop most of math-
ematics), and these theorems will then be true statements about any universe.
However, just as for the theory of groups, some statements are neither provable nor
disprovable from the axioms; a classic example is the Continuum Hypothesis (CH).
In fact, given any universe, we can construct from it both a universe in which ch
is true and a universe in which ch is false. The former is easy to describe: the
constructible universe L =
⋃
Lα is always a model of zfc+ch. The latter requires
a more involved technique called forcing which is irrelevant to us here. Thus, if
zfc is consistent, then both zfc+ch and zfc + not ch are consistent.
Of course, one is entitled to wonder whether zfc is consistent; that is, whether
there are any universes. This is no more or less valid, from a purely logical stand-
point, as wondering whether there are any groups. We are used to the existence of
lots of groups, but all the groups we are familiar with are constructed within the
framework of a stronger theory—namely, set theory. In other words, assuming the
existence of a universe, we can construct groups, but with only the axioms of group
theory, we can’t expect to get anywhere. By analogy, we can’t expect to be able to
3As we have stated them, the axioms of zfc do not allow objects which are not sets. It is
easy to modify them to allow such ‘urelements’, but there seems little point to doing so, since
experience shows that everything in mathematics can be constructed using sets.
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prove the existence of a universe unless we work within the framework of some yet
stronger theory.
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem is a formal way of saying this: no rea-
sonable4 and consistent axiom system T which includes arithmetic (such as zfc)
can prove its own consistency. It can be found in many books on logic (I like [CL01]
for mathematicians, while everyone should read [Hof79]), but the proof is so simple
in outline that every mathematician should be exposed to it. First, by coding logical
statements and proofs as natural numbers, Go¨del enabled T to talk about prov-
ability and consistency. He then constructed a statement G about natural numbers
which said in effect “this statement is not provable in T ”. Thus, if G is provable, it
is false. Hence, if T is consistent, it cannot prove G, and thus G is true. So there is
a statement which is true, but not provable in T ; this is the First Incompleteness
Theorem. Note that the completeness theorem then implies that any reasonable
and consistent theory has more than one model.
Now, the same coding of statements and proofs produces a statement about
natural numbers which expresses ‘internally’ our inability to derive a contradiction
from the axioms of T ; call this statement Con(T ). By internalizing the proof of
the First Incompleteness Theorem, we can prove in T that Con(T ) implies that G
is not provable, and hence that G is true. Since T cannot prove that G is true, it
follows that T cannot prove Con(T ); this is the Second Incompleteness Theorem.5
By the completeness theorem, it follows that we cannot prove in T the existence
of a model for T . Moreover, if we can prove the existence of a model for T in some
other theory T ′, then T ′ implies Con(T ), and therefore Con(T ) does not imply
Con(T ′); otherwise it would imply Con(Con(T )), contradicting the incompleteness
theorem.6 So if one theory can prove the existence of a model for another, the first
theory is irreducibly stronger in this precise sense.
Remark 5.1. Actually, even without knowing the incompleteness theorem, or if
we have an ‘unreasonable’ T to which it does not apply, it is easy to see that a
proof of Con(T ) in T would be useless anyway. For since anything follows from a
contradiction, if T were inconsistent, it would also prove Con(T ). Thus, a proof
of Con(T ) in T would still not allow us to conclude that T is actually consistent.
The incompleteness theorem gives the stronger result that a proof of Con(T ) in T
in fact implies that T is inconsistent.
4By ‘reasonable’ I mean that there is a systematic way to verify whether or not any given
statement is an axiom. This excludes, for example, the system whose axioms are ‘all true state-
ments about the natural numbers’, to which of course the incompleteness theorem does not apply,
but which is not much use as an axiom system in practice.
5The attentive reader will notice that this implies that if T is consistent, then there exist
models of T in which Con(T ) is false! To make sense of this, remember that Con(T ) actually
says something like “there does not exist a natural number n which codes for a proof of 0 = 1 in
T .” Since T is consistent, there is no such proof, and thus no ‘real’ natural number can code one,
but bizarre models of T can contain ‘nonstandard’ natural numbers which satisfy the arithmetical
property which we interpret as coding for such a proof.
6Care is needed, however, when dealing with theories like zfc that have infinitely many axioms.
It is possible to have a consistent theory T in which one can define a set M and prove, for each
axiom ψ of T , that ψ is true inM . Such a theorem-schema does not contradict the incompleteness
theorem; that would require proving a single theorem in T to the effect of “for each axiom ψ of
T , ψ is true in M”. Ironically, one example of such a theory T is zfc + “zfc is inconsistent”,
which (by the incompleteness theorem) is consistent if zfc is; see [Kun80, IV.10]. We will see in
§11 that zfc itself is almost such a theory.
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A similar result called Tarski’s undefinability theorem says that there is no de-
finable property ϕ of natural numbers such that ϕ(n) is true in some model of T
if and only if n is the Go¨del code of a statement which is true in that model. For
suppose there were. Let ψ1, ψ2, . . . be an enumeration of all definable properties
of natural numbers, and for any n let #n(n) be the Go¨del code of the statement
ψn(n). Now the statement “ϕ(#n(n)) is false” is a definable property of n, so it is
equal to ψk for some k. Then we have (in our model)
ψk(k) ⇐⇒ ϕ(#k(k)) is false ⇐⇒ ψk(k) is false
which is absurd; thus ϕ cannot exist.
On the other hand, since mathematical logic can be formalized in set theory just
as most branches of mathematics can, zfc has no problem talking about truth in
a model which is a set. That is, in zfc there is a definable property ϕ such that
ϕ(n, x) is true if and only if n is the Go¨del code of a statement which is true in x,
regarded as a model of set theory. This will also be important later on.
Remark 5.2. The axioms of set theory and of group theory do differ in an important
philosophical way. The axioms of group theory are chosen because we see many
objects ‘in nature’ which satisfy them (whatever that means), and we want to
study all these objects under one heading. On the other hand, we do not see many
examples of universes in nature—many people would argue that we see only one.
The axioms of set theory are chosen for their usefulness, sufficiency, and consistency
in working with sets, rather than claiming to be the ‘correct’ description of an
independently occurring class of models.
6. Classes and large categories
With some basic set theory under our belts, we now move on to category theory.
By analogy with the theory of groups and the theory of sets discussed in §5, we can
consider the theory of categories. This theory deals with two types of things, called
‘objects’ and ‘arrows’, together with domain, codomain, identity, and composition
functions satisfying unit and associativity axioms. A model of this theory is, of
course, a category. Note that this abstract notion of ‘a category’ can be defined
without reference to any sort of set theory.
In the context of a universe V , we generally refer to a category whose collections
of objects and arrows are sets in V as a small category. When working with small
categories with respect to some universe, we have all the tools of set theory at our
disposal, and everything we might expect to be true, is. For example, given any
two small categories A and B, there is a small category [A,B] whose objects are
functors A→ B and whose arrows are natural transformations.
However, frequently even when working in the context of set theory, we want
to consider categories which are not small. The obvious example is the category
Set = Set[V ] whose objects are all sets (that is, all elements of the universe V )
and whose arrows are all functions between sets. Cantor’s paradox ensures that
Set is not small. Non-small categories are usually called (surprise!) large.
If we are content to work with one large category at a time, we can just use the
theory of categories described above. It is when we want to construct new large
categories and functors that we run into problems, because the powerful tools of
set theory are no longer at our disposal for working with collections of objects that
are not sets. Our goal is to consider various methods for dealing with this problem.
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First of all, there is an approach that remains completely within zfc. We define
a class to be a collection of sets specified by some property expressible in the
language of set theory. Instead of working directly with classes, for which we have
no axioms, we can then work instead with the properties which characterize them.
For example, the property “X is a pair (G, ·) where G is a set and · is a binary
operation on G making it into a group” is expressible in the language of set theory,
so there is a class of all groups—by which we mean all groups defined from the
universe V . Of course, there is also a class of all sets, which we usually identify
with the universe V . Note that classes of this sort are actually implicit in the
axioms of zfc; for example, the axiom of replacement says that the image of a set
under any ‘class function’ is a set. Some classes, of course, are sets; those which
are not sets are called proper classes.
We then define a large category to be one, such as Set and Grp, whose
collections of objects and arrows are classes in this sense. We can now perform
some basic constructions on large categories. For example, if P and Q are properties
expressible in set theory, then “X is a pair (Y, Z) such that Y satisfies P and Z
satisfies Q” is also so expressible. Thus the cartesian product of two classes is a
class, and the cartesian product of two large categories is another large category. We
can also prove that Set and other familiar categories are complete and cocomplete,
as defined in §2.
Remark 6.1. Most large categories which arise in applications are also locally small;
that is, they have only a set of morphisms between any two objects.. This property
is undeniably important, as we saw in the proof of the Adjoint Functor Theorem,
but we will mostly ignore it, because it plays almost no role when discussing foun-
dations: locally small categories present exactly the same set-theoretic issues that
all large categories do.
However, this approach to large categories has the disadvantage that we have
no axioms for manipulating classes; they are not ‘things’ that zfc knows about at
all. Thus, instead of working with classes directly, we have to work with the logical
formulas which characterize their elements, and interpret any construction in these
terms.
In particular, the language of zfc does not include a way to quantify over classes.
In other words, no theorem containing the phrases “for any large category A” or
“there exists a large category A” can be even stated, let alone proven, in zfc. This
includes, for example, the Adjoint Functor Theorem. Usually this is dealt with by
proving instead a ‘meta-theorem’ of the form “for any large category A, we can
prove in zfc that (some statement about A)”, but again in stating such a theorem
we have moved beyond zfc into some sort of ‘meta-language’.
Moreover, even this trick cannot handle theorems whose hypotheses involve quan-
tification over classes. For example, consider the final statement in Theorem 2.1: if
a large category has products indexed by proper classes, then it is a preorder. Even
if we fix a large category A, the statement “A has products indexed by proper
classes” is of the form “for any class . . . ”, and thus cannot be stated in zfc. Hence
we cannot prove this result even as a theorem-schema in zfc.
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7. Axioms for classes
To resolve these sorts of issues, we are motivated to extend zfc by introducing
classes as a new type of thing, in addition to sets, along with axioms for manipulat-
ing them. A good overview of such class-set theories can be found in [Le´v76]. Prob-
ably the most common such theory is von Neumann-Bernays-Go¨del (NBG)
set theory. Its axioms can also be found in books or on the Internet; as with zfc
we divide them into several groups.
(i) Typing: only sets can be elements of sets or classes.
(ii) The basic axioms: extensionality for sets and classes, the empty set, pairing
and union for sets, foundation for sets and classes, and comprehension.
(iii) The size-increasing axioms: power sets and limitation of size.
(iv) The size-assertion axiom: an infinite set exists.
(v) The axiom of choice.
The axiom schema of comprehension states that for any property ϕ(x) which does
not quantify over classes, there is a class {x | ϕ(x)} of all sets x such that ϕ(x).
The limitation of size axiom says that a class is a set if and only if it is not bijective
with the class V of all sets. Thus, sets are precisely the classes which are ‘not too
big’, while all proper classes are the same size.
Comprehension and limitation of size easily imply separation and replacement,
so the sets in nbg satisfy zfc. Moreover, nbg can be shown to be a conservative
extension of zfc. That means that any statement about sets which is provable in
nbg is also provable in zfc. In fact, if we start with any model of zfc, then taking
the classes to be those defined in §6, we obtain a model of nbg. Thus, using nbg
really entails no ‘ontological’ commitment beyond that of zfc.
However, unlike zfc, the language of nbg allows us to quantify over classes
(although such quantifications cannot be used in the comprehension axiom). Thus,
theorems such as the Adjoint Functor Theorem can be stated and proven formally
within nbg. To prove the large-category version of Theorem 2.1, we have to be
careful to avoid talking about 2|Arr(A)|, which doesn’t exist in nbg, but we can
instead directly derive a contradiction to the axiom of limitation of size.
Moreover, nbg makes constructions on classes easier to deal with. For example,
comprehension proves easily that any two classes have a cartesian product, and thus
so do any two large categories. We can also perform more complicated constructions
as long as they don’t produce things that are ‘too big’.
Example 7.1. Let A be a large category; we construct its idempotent-splitting A,
also called Karoubian completion or Cauchy completion. The objects of A are the
idempotents of A; that is, arrows e with ee = e. The property “e is an arrow
of A and ee = e” is expressible in nbg and doesn’t quantify over classes, so by
comprehension, there is a class of all such idempotents. Similarly, the arrows of A
from e to e′ are the arrows f with fe = f and e′f = f ; this is likewise expressible
without quantification over classes, so there is a class of all such arrows. The rest
of the structure of A follows in the same way.
Example 7.2. Let A be a large monoidal category; we construct a strict monoidal
category A′ monoidally equivalent to A. One of the usual constructions is to let
the objects of A′ be finite strings of objects of A, with morphisms induced by those
of A. Since the property “X is a function from some natural number n to the class
of objects of A” does not quantify over classes, the class of all such functions exists;
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we take this to be the class of objects ofA′. Any such function (as a class of ordered
pairs) is bijective with n and thus is a set. The rest of the structure is similar.
Another example of the usefulness of having a good axiomatic system for classes
lies in our ability to make a large number of choices. Suppose that A is a category
with finite products; it is usual to make a choice of a product X × Y for each pair
of objects X,Y ∈ A in order to define a product functor A×A→ A. In particular
cases there is usually a standard choice of X × Y , but to do this in general one
needs an axiom of choice for the objects of A. If A is a large category, then one
needs an axiom of choice for classes. We call this the axiom of global choice; it
turns out to have the following equivalent forms.
(i) We can choose an element from each of any class of nonempty sets.
(ii) We can choose an element from each of any collection of nonempty classes.7
(iii) The class V of all sets can be well-ordered.
Global choice (and hence ordinary choice as well) is a consequence of the axioms of
nbg, by the following observation of von Neumann.
Theorem 7.3. In nbg, there is a well-ordering of V .
Proof. The class Ω of ordinals is well-ordered. Thus, if it were a set, it would itself
be an ordinal; but then it would have a successor, which is absurd. Thus Ω is not
a set (this is Burali-Forti’s paradox). By limitation of size, Ω is bijective to V , and
thus V acquires a well-ordering. 
If one objects to global choice despite the pleasing cleverness of this argument,
it is not hard to modify the axioms of nbg so that they no longer imply it. Here
we should also mention [Mak96]. However, global choice is implicitly used by many
familiar categorical constructions.
Example 7.4. We have already noted that if A has products, then applying ver-
sion (ii) of global choice, we can choose a product X × Y for each pair X,Y and
thereby define a functor A ×A → A. Similar remarks, of course, apply to other
limits and colimits, and other objects defined by universal properties, such as tensor
products.
Example 7.5. If F : A → B is a functor which is full, faithful, and essentially
surjective, then by choosing for each b ∈ B an object Gb ∈ A and an isomorphism
FGa ∼= b, we can construct an inverse equivalence G : B→ A.
Example 7.6. By choosing one object in each isomorphism class, we can show that
any large category has a skeleton.
Example 7.7. Let W be a class of morphisms in a large category A; we want to
construct a ‘localization’ A[W−1] by formally adding inverses to the morphisms in
W . The objects of A[W−1] are the same as those of A, while its morphisms are
supposed to be equivalence classes of zigzags
·
∼
←− · −→ · · · · · −→ ·
∼
←−
7Note, however, that there is a standard trick in zfc which enables us to choose an element
from each of any set of nonempty classes. To be precise, if we have a formula ϕ(x, y) such that
for any x ∈ X there is a y with ϕ(x, y), we can define a function f on X such that ϕ(x, f(x)) for
all x ∈ X. We do this by first considering, for each x ∈ X, the class of all sets y of least rank such
that ϕ(x, y); this is a set since it is a subset of some Vα. We then apply the ordinary axiom of
choice.
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of morphisms in A, where the backwards arrows are in W . Comprehension guar-
antees there is a class of such zigzags. However, we cannot define the quotient of
a class by an equivalence relation whose equivalence classes are proper classes—
at least not in the usual way, since no class can be an element of another class.
But what we can do instead is use global choice to choose one zigzag from each
equivalence class, thereby obtaining a class of morphisms for A[W−1].
Of course, in general, A[W−1] defined in this way need not be locally small or
at all amenable to computation. In practice, there are usually alternate ways to
construct A[W−1], which also show that in those cases it is locally small.
Example 7.8. The left derived functors of a functor F evaluated at an object X of
some abelian category are given by choosing a projective resolution · · · → P1 →
P0 → X and computing the homology of the chain complex · · · → FP1 → FP0. Of
course, defining the whole derived functor requires the global choice of a projective
resolution for each object X .
On the other hand, nbg is not quite as comfortable an axiom system as we
might like. Consider mathematical induction, which is surely a basic notion in
mathematics if ever there was one. In zfc, we can prove induction for any defin-
able statement ϕ(n), by considering the set {n ∈ N | not ϕ(n)} and using the fact
that N is well-ordered. In nbg the same argument works only if ϕ does not involve
quantification over class variables, due to the analogous restriction in the compre-
hension axiom. This includes all statements for which zfc could prove induction
(as it must, since nbg is a conservative extension of zfc), but not all statements
in our ‘new language’ which can refer to classes.
One might object to this consequence of nbg on the philosophical grounds that
mathematical induction ‘should’ be true for all statements ϕ, without needing
technical restrictions on quantification. But the failure of induction also has real
consequences for dealing with classes. For instance, we cannot prove by induction
on n that every large category A has an n-fold cartesian product An. In this case,
we can construct An directly as the class of functions from n into A, but it is
troubling that the induction proof is not allowed in nbg.8 If any reader can think
of a natural statement about large categories, normally proven by induction, and
not having an obvious alternate proof in nbg, I would be very interested.
We may, of course, strengthen the comprehension axiom of nbg to allow formu-
las with arbitrary quantification (sometimes called impredicative comprehension),
thereby recovering full mathematical induction. This gives a variant of nbg usually
called Morse-Kelley (MK) set theory. However, by doing so we lose conser-
vativity over zfc. In mk one can prove that the class V of all sets is a model for
zfc and conclude that zfc is consistent. For example, to prove the separation and
replacement axioms, we first apply comprehension to construct the desired set or
8In defense of nbg, I should say that it was originally conceived not to deal with large categories,
but to provide a finitely axiomatizable theory equivalent to zfc, and at that it succeeds. This is
not immediately obvious, since we have stated comprehension as an axiom schema, but it turns
out that a finite number of its instances suffice to imply the rest. There is no great mystery about
this: we simply observe that any definable property ϕ is built up from a finite number of building
blocks like ‘and’, ‘or’ and ‘there exists’, and the corresponding class {x | ϕ(x)} can be built up by
a corresponding finite number of constructions like intersection, union, and projection. However,
it does depend on limiting comprehension to properties not quantifying over classes; thus mk (see
below) is not finitely axiomatizable in this way.
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function as a class, then apply limitation of size to conclude that it is a set. It then
follows from the incompleteness theorem that Con(zfc) does not imply Con(mk).9
So unlike nbg, mk is a genuinely stronger theory than zfc.
Even mk, however, is not fully satisfactory in the constructions it allows for large
categories. For example, if A and B are large categories, nothing we have seen so
far allows us to construct a functor category [A,B]. There is no problem when A
is small, since then each functor A → B is itself a set by replacement, and so we
have a class of such—but when A is large, this argument fails. However, there is
no intuitive reason preventing us from making such a construction: the collection
of functions from one class to another seems like a perfectly good collection.
We could envision adding more axioms which enable us to perform these and
other constructions with classes. In fact, the best possible world would be if classes
could be manipulated just like sets, and any construction we could do for sets could
also be done for classes. This would be easy to achieve: we could just write down
another copy of the zfc axioms, substituting ‘class’ for ‘set’ everywhere in the
second copy. On the other hand, it seems terribly wasteful to have two copies of
every axiom, when all we really want to say is that classes and sets behave in just
the same ways, except that sets can’t be too large. In the next section we consider
a cleaner solution.
8. Inaccessibles and Grothendieck universes
In zfc, there are three ways to prove the existence of larger and larger sets.
(1) By fiat : the axiom of infinity asserts that there exists an infinite set.
Without it, only finite sets can be constructed.
(2) By powers : the axiom of power sets produces a set PA larger than a given
set A (by Cantor’s diagonalization argument).
(3) By limits : The axiom of replacement guarantees that the union of any
family of sets indexed by a set is also a set.10 If the family is infinite and
increasing in size, its union will be larger than any of its elements. For
example, this applies to a family such as A, PA, PPA, . . . .
This is where I got the terminology ‘size-assertion’ and ‘size-increasing’ in §3; the
axiom of infinity produces a large set by fiat, while the axioms of power set and
replacement produce larger sets from existing ones. However, not all cardinalities
can be reached by these methods; we introduce special names for those that can’t.
9Why, the reader may reasonably wonder, can we not do the same in nbg? We can prove in
nbg that V satisfies any particular axiom of zfc, but as in footnote 6, to conclude Con(zfc) we
need instead the single theorem “for all axioms ψ of zfc, V satisfies ψ”. To even state this formally
when there are infinitely many axioms, we must encode axioms by their Go¨del numbers. Just as
zfc can talk about truth in set models, in nbg we have a definable property ϕ such that ϕ(n) is
true if and only if n is the Go¨del code of a true statement involving only sets—but this ϕ involves
quantification over classes. Thus, we require the strength of mk to form the class {x | ψ(x)} given
only the Go¨del number of ψ, as is necessary for the above proof of Con(zfc). This distinction
is well explained in [Mos50, Mos51], along with resulting concrete examples of the failure of full
mathematical induction and full class comprehension in nbg.
10In more detail, let A be a set and F a class function on A. Such an F is characterized by
some definable property ϕ such that for any x ∈ A there exists a unique y with ϕ(x, y). Then
replacement gives the set {y | ∃x ∈ A ϕ(x, y)}, to which we can then apply the union axiom to
give the set
S
x∈A
F (x). It is natural to wonder why I call replacement the culprit here, when the
union axiom seems at least equally culpable; one answer is that, as we will see below, small models
of zfc satisfying the union axiom abound, while ones satisfying replacement are quite rare.
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(i) A cardinal is uncountable if it is larger than the smallest infinite set.
(ii) A cardinal κ is a strong limit if for any λ < κ we have 2λ < κ.
(iii) A cardinal κ is regular if it is not the union of a family of sets of size < κ
indexed by a set of size < κ.
(iv) A cardinal is inaccessible if it is uncountable, a strong limit, and regular.
For example, the first uncountable cardinal ℵ1 is regular, since the countable
union of countable sets is countable, but it is not a strong limit, since 2ℵ0 ≥ ℵ1.
On the other hand, the cardinal iω (see Example 4.1) is a strong limit, but not
regular.
Now, in any universe V , the set Vα with its induced relation of membership
is itself a model of many of the axioms of zfc. It is easy to see that if α is
a limit ordinal greater than ω, then Vα satisfies the basic axioms, choice, power
set, and infinity—all the axioms of zfc except replacement. In particular, since
|Vω+α| = iα, without replacement we can only construct sets of cardinality < iω.
It turns out that if α is an inaccessible cardinal, then Vα is also a model of
replacement, and hence of all of zfc. (The converse, however, is false, as we will
see in §11.) The proof is the same as the proof in mk that V satisfies replacement,
using the inaccessibility of α in place of limitation of size. When α is inaccessible
we call Vα aGrothendieck universe. One can equivalently define a Grothendieck
universe to be a set U which is transitive (x ∈ y ∈ U implies x ∈ U) and closed
under pairing, power sets, and indexed unions. It turns out that this is equivalent
to asserting U = Vκ for some inaccessible κ; see [Bou72].
Now suppose there exists an inaccessible, and let κ be the smallest inaccessible.
Then Vκ satisfies zfc and also “there does not exist an inaccessible”; hence it is
impossible to prove in zfc that there exists an inaccessible. But this is not really
surprising, since we have essentially defined inaccessibles to be those cardinals which
are unreachable by all the ways that zfc knows to build bigger sets!
More that this is true, however. If we write ZFC+I for zfc + “there exists
an inaccessible”, then even assuming that zfc is consistent, it is not possible to
prove that zfc+i is consistent. For just as we can prove in mk that V is a model
of zfc, we can prove in zfc that any Grothendieck universe is a model of zfc;
hence zfc+i implies Con(zfc). Thus, by the incompleteness theorem, Con(zfc)
does not imply Con(zfc+i). In other words, in contrast to the situation for ch, we
cannot construct, from an arbitrary universe, another universe satisfying zfc+i.
Note that Con(zfc), which is provable in zfc+i but not in zfc, is a statement not
about sets but about natural numbers—albeit a rather complicated one.
Laying aside questions of existence and consistency for the moment, we can solve
the problems raised at the end of §7 as follows. Working in zfc+i, we choose an
inaccessible κ, and re-define set to mean ‘element of Vκ’ and class to mean ‘set not
necessarily in Vκ’. Thus defined, sets and classes will behave in exactly the same
way, except that sets are limited in rank. A more common terminology, however,
which we will adopt, is not to redefine ‘set’ but to refer to elements of Vκ as small
sets and other sets as large sets.
Note that small sets have a limitation on rank rather than cardinality. No small
set can be larger in cardinality than κ, but many sets with small cardinality are
not small, such as the singleton {κ}. The class of sets with small cardinality is not
a model of zfc, since it is not closed under unions (
⋃
{κ} = κ), nor is it itself a set
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(even a large one). Thus, if we want a category Set of small sets whose collection
of objects is a large set, we need to use rank rather than cardinality.11
Of course, any category of sets is determined up to equivalence by the cardi-
nalities of its objects, so in some sense, this doesn’t matter. For this reason, it is
common to also call sets small if their cardinality is small, and in category theory,
where we work with objects up to isomorphism anyway, this is usually harmless.
This third approach allows many more large categories than the first two. For
instance, for any two large categories A and B, there is a functor category [A,B].
Note that unlike in nbg, where all proper classes have the same size, [A,B] will
generally be larger than A or B. In particular, the term large category in this
approach is significantly more inclusive than it is in the previous two.
One should think of the classes in nbg and mk as corresponding to the large sets
of rank (or cardinality) ≤ κ. In fact, one can make this precise. If κ is inaccessible,
we obtain a model of mk (and hence nbg) by taking Vκ for the sets and Vκ+1 = PVκ
for the classes. (Note that this means we can prove Con(mk) in zfc+i, so zfc+i
is strictly stronger than mk.) Similarly, we obtain a model of nbg (but not mk) if
we take Vκ for the sets and Def(Vκ) for the classes (recall Example 4.3).
In [Str81], sets and categories of cardinality ≤ κ (which are those appearing, up
to isomorphism, in Vκ+1) were calledmoderate. We will refer to sets and categories
in Def(Vκ) as small-definable. Small-definable categories are those which would
exist as classes even in zfc or nbg; this includes nearly all large categories in which
we are actually interested for their own sake. However, the existence of other large
categories is frequently quite useful for formal reasons; it is the primary advantage
of using inaccessibles. In the following examples we assume an inaccessible κ.
Example 8.1. Any large category A has a presheaf category [Aop ,Set], and if A is
locally small, it has a Yoneda embedding y : A →֒ [Aop ,Set]. Limits and colimits
in large functor categories can still be calculated pointwise, so [Aop ,Set] is still
complete and cocomplete. Important properties of A can be expressed in terms
of y; for example, A is total (see [Kel86]) if y has a left adjoint. Totality can be
expressed without reference to [Aop ,Set] (although not without quantifying over
classes), but at the price of a certain amount of economy and clarity.
Example 8.2. Any large A has an endofunctor category [A,A], which is strict
monoidal under composition of functors. If A is also monoidal, then the functor
A→ [A,A] taking X ∈ A to (X ⊗−) is strong monoidal. We can thus apply the
idea of [ML98, XI.3 Ex. 3] to find a strictification of A inside [A,A].
Example 8.3. It is well-known in algebraic geometry that the category Sch of
schemes is equivalent to a certain subcategory of [Ring,Set]. The category Sch
also has other definitions (for instance, as locally affine locally ringed spaces), show-
ing that it is small-definable (up to equivalence) and locally small. However, iden-
tifying it with a subcategory of [Ring,Set] is often useful, yet impossible unless
the latter category exists.
11There is, however, an approach to universes based on cardinality: for any infinite cardinal
κ let Hκ denote the set of sets which are hereditarily of cardinality < κ; that is, their transitive
closure has cardinality < κ. Then Hκ ⊂ Vκ, and if κ is regular and uncountable, Hκ satisfies all
the axioms of zfc except power set. Moreover, κ is inaccessible if and only if Hκ satisfies all of
zfc, and if and only if Hκ = Vκ.
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Example 8.4. Similarly, the category Ind(A) of ind-objects in a large category A
can be identified with the small filtered colimits of representable presheaves in
[Aop ,Set]. Like Sch, the category Ind(A) has an alternate description showing
that it is small-definable (up to equivalence, as long as A is), but this description
of it is frequently also useful.
Example 8.5. Let U : CptHaus → Set be the forgetful functor from compact
Hausdorff spaces to sets. A quasi-topological space is a set X equipped with a sub-
functor of Set(U−, X) : CptHausop → Set satisfying certain natural conditions;
see [Spa63]. The categoryQTop of quasi-topological spaces is cartesian closed, and
was a contender for a convenient category of spaces before the current ascendancy
of compactly generated spaces (for which see [ML98, VII.8] and [May99, Ch. 5]).
Since a single quasi-topological space contains a large amount of data, QTop is
not small-definable, though it is locally small. Hence nbg and mk are insufficient
to guarantee that QTop even exists. Also, a fixed set X supports a large num-
ber of quasi-topologies, and QTop is not well-powered or well-copowered. It is,
however, complete and cocomplete, and admits intersections of arbitrary families
of monomorphisms and cointersections of arbitrary families of epimorphisms.
Example 8.6. In addition to its reassuring psychological effect, moderateness (and
small-definability) of a category can have mathematical consequences. This is be-
cause a set A is moderate if and only if we can express it as an increasing union of
small sets indexed by small ordinals, A =
⋃
α<κAα where each Aα is small. Thus,
we can prove things about moderate sets by a transfinite induction in which every
stage of the induction is small. For example, a proof of Freyd given in [Str81] shows
that if A is moderate, total, and the left adjoint of y preserves finite limits, then
A actually has a small generating set and is a Grothendieck topos.
Sometimes it is useful to assume more than one inaccessible. For example, when
doing formal category theory we may want to form the category (or 2-category) of
all large categories, or of all locally small categories. Of course, the class of all large
categories is not a set, even a large one. (The class of small-definable categories is
a large set, but it is not closed under constructions such as functor categories.) To
resolve this issue, we can use the techniques of §§6–7 to introduce classes that are
larger than large sets, or we can assume a second inaccessible λ > κ, define large
to mean an element of Vλ, and use very large to mean a set not necessarily in Vλ.
(Some authors have used ‘quasi-category’ for what we call a ‘very large category’,
but we eschew that term in view of its quite different recent connotations [Joy02].
The term ‘meta-category’ is also sometimes used.)
Having a very large category CAT of large categories allows us to make state-
ments like the following.
• Taking a small category to its presheaf category is a functor from the
category Cat of small categories to the category CAT of large ones.
• Taking a ring R to the category of R-modules is a functor from Ring to
CAT.
• Taking a monoidal categoryV to the category V-Cat of small V-enriched
categories is a functor from MONCAT to CAT.
If we want to have a functor taking V to the very large category V-CAT of large
V-enriched categories, its codomain will have to be an extremely large category of
very large categories, so we need at least three inaccessibles. One is unavoidably
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reminded of how, in the original category theory paper [EM45], (large) categories
were introduced only in order to serve as the domains and codomains of functors.
9. Aside: large cardinals
Notice the strong analogy between the axiom “there exists an inaccessible” and
the axiom of infinity: both construct “by fiat” larger sets than can otherwise be
shown to exist. Other axioms of this sort, asserting the existence of inaccessibles
satisfying various extra properties, are also used in modern set theory. Of course,
these are stronger assumptions than the mere existence of an inaccessible. In fact,
the existence of even one cardinal with one of these stronger properties usually
implies the existence of many smaller inaccessibles.
Let me attempt to give a flavor of just how large such large cardinals can get.
(The terminological collision between ‘large category’ and ‘large cardinal’ is unfor-
tunate, but context usually suffices to distinguish.) A subset X ⊂ κ is said to be
closed unbounded if sup(X) = κ and whenever Y ⊂ X and sup(Y ) < κ, then
also sup(Y ) ∈ X . A subset X ⊂ κ is stationary if it has nonempty intersection
with every closed unbounded set. Evidently any stationary set is unbounded, and
hence (if κ is inaccessible) has cardinality κ.
An inaccessible κ is said to be Mahlo if the set of inaccessibles less than κ is
stationary in κ. This implies that there are κ inaccessibles less than κ, but also
that there are κ inaccessibles λ < κ such that there are λ inaccessibles less than λ,
and κ inaccessibles below κ with this property, and so on. This pattern continues
for many larger types of cardinals:
• If κ is weakly compact, then Mahlo cardinals are stationary in κ.
• If κ is measurable, then weakly compact cardinals are stationary in κ.
• If κ is supercompact, then measurable cardinals are stationary in κ.
• If κ is extendible, then supercompact cardinals are stationary in κ.
• If κ is superhuge, then extendible cardinals are stationary in κ.
Unlike for Mahlo cardinals, these stationarity properties are not the definitions of
these larger cardinals, but consequences thereof.12 Their actual definitions can be
found in books (for example, [Jec03, Kan03]) or the Internet.
The purpose of large cardinals in set theory is not just to see how large sets can
get, but to provide a yardstick to measure the strength of other axioms, and in some
cases even to prove new results about ‘small’ sets. For instance, the existence of a
measurable cardinal implies that V 6= L, the existence of infinitely many Woodin
cardinals implies projective determinacy, and at least some set theorists hope that
a large cardinal axiom can be found which will settle the continuum hypothesis;
see [Mad88a, Mad88b].
Perhaps surprisingly, set theorists currently believe that there is an upper bound
to how large large cardinals can get: there are notions of n-huge cardinal for all
n < ω, but the limiting case of an ‘ω-huge’ cardinal is known to be inconsistent
with zfc. However, even large-cardinal axioms only slightly weaker than ω-hugeness
have so far resisted all efforts to disprove them.
12When comparing large cardinal axioms in set theory, consistency strength is usually more
important than raw size. Obviously, if there are many X cardinals below any Y cardinal, then
the consistency of a Y implies that of an X, but the converse is not always true. For example,
a huge cardinal implies the consistency of extendible cardinals, and hence of supercompact ones,
but the least huge cardinal is less than the least supercompact cardinal (if both exist).
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Returning to category theory, it is natural to wonder whether large cardinal
properties could have noticeable effects on Set and categories constructed from
it. This is indeed the case, although for most category-theoretic purposes one
inaccessible is as good as another. For example, it is proven in [AR94, A.5] that
Setop has a small dense full subcategory if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily
large measurable cardinals. If there are no measurable cardinals, then the single
set N is dense in Setop , and thus Setop is equivalent to a full subcategory of the
category of M -sets, where M is the monoid of endomorphisms of N.13
In general, while large cardinal axioms in set theory usually assert the existence
of one or more cardinals with a certain property, what tends to matter for cate-
gory theory is the character of the particular ‘size of the universe’ cardinal κ. For
example, what matters for the result quoted above is whether the measurable car-
dinals are unbounded below κ, rather than how many measurable cardinals there
are in ‘absolute’ terms. Moreover, in most cases, the assertion that “the cardinal
of the universe has property P” can be phrased in nbg (and sometimes even zfc),
without requiring the existence of any sets larger than the universe.
The most interesting examples of this sort that I know of concern Vopeˇnka’s
principle. This has many equivalent forms; here are a few categorical ones.
• No locally presentable category has a large discrete full subcategory.
• Every complete or cocomplete category with a small dense full subcategory
is locally presentable.
• Every category with a small dense full subcategory is well-copowered.
None of these can even be stated in zfc, since they all involve quantification over
large categories, but there is no problem in nbg. Vopeˇnka’s principle has many other
pleasing consequences for the structure of locally presentable categories (see [AR94,
Ch. 6]), and also implies the existence of arbitrary cohomological localizations in
homotopy theory [CSS05], which are not known to exist in zfc.
We say that a cardinal κ is Vopeˇnka if Vopeˇnka’s principle holds in zfc+i with
κ as the size of the universe. This is equivalent to saying that Vopeˇnka’s principle
holds in Vκ regarded as a model of mk, but stronger than the analogous assertion
involving nbg. Since Setop is not locally presentable, the assertions I have made
so far imply that measurable cardinals are unbounded below any Vopeˇnka cardinal,
but more is true: if κ is Vopeˇnka, then the sets
{λ < κ | λ is measurable}
{λ < κ | λ is extendible in Vκ}
are stationary in κ. This makes the existence of even one Vopeˇnka cardinal quite
a strong assumption, as large-cardinal axioms go. On the other hand, Vopeˇnka
cardinals are stationary in any ‘almost huge’ cardinal.
10. Inaccessibles or not?
So, should we assume inaccessibles? As we have seen, the existence of an
inaccessible—even the consistency of the existence of an inaccessible—is unprovable
from zfc, so such an assumption is a genuine strengthening of the axioms. On the
13I am inclined to regard this as an argument in favor of the existence of measurable cardinals,
though of course others may disagree. Note that Setop is also equivalent to the category of
profinite Boolean algebras (by Stone duality), and to the category of algebras for the double-
power-set monad on Set.
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other hand, there are many philosophical and mathematical arguments that can
be advanced in its favor; see [Mad88a] for a fascinating discussion. Moreover, we
have seen that it is quite weak compared to many large-cardinal axioms commonly
used in modern set theory, and from which no contradiction has yet been derived.
Thus, it seems unlikely that the existence of inaccessibles can be disproven from
zfc (though it is provably impossible to prove that it can’t be!).
However, from the point of view of ordinary category theory, these questions are
not as relevant, because the role of inaccessibles in category theory is quite different
from their role in set theory. In category theory, inaccessibles mostly play the role of
a convenience which simplifies the statements and proofs of our theorems, without
really entailing any deep ontological commitment. This is because we think of the
small sets as the ‘real’ sets; we only introduced the large ones as a well-behaved
model for proper classes. All ordinary mathematical objects, like groups, rings,
topological spaces, manifolds, and so on, are small.
Moreover, all categories of ordinary objects which arise in practice, such as Set
and Grp, are small-definable, and would exist as classes even in zfc or nbg. And
we saw that categories such as Sch and Ind(A) have equivalent forms which are
small-definable, even though they can also be usefully characterized with reference
to categories that are not.
In a similar way, a statement like “V 7→ V-Cat is a functor” can be regarded
merely as a ‘code’ which encapsulates many individual statements in a concise
way. For example, it implies that any monoidal functor V→W induces a functor
V-Cat → W-Cat, and composition is preserved. However, for any particular
monoidal functor V →W, we could easily check this directly, without needing to
assert the existence of the whole functor, and thus its very large codomain CAT.14
Thus, often in category theory, the assumption of inaccessibles can be regarded
as merely a convenience (although a very convenient one!). Thus, it is natural
to wonder under what conditions the use of inaccessibles can be eliminated from
categorical arguments.
There is another unsatisfactory aspect of zfc+i. We have asserted that we only
consider objects smaller than κ to be ‘ordinary mathematical objects’, but what
if at some later date we discover that there happens to be a group larger than κ
which we want to include as a mathematical object? Clearly this means that we
chose the wrong κ to define ‘small’ and ‘large’ and we should choose a larger one. In
particular, we may want to use category theory to study the category of categories,
and then apply our results to large categories as well as small ones.
To ensure that such switches would always be possible, Grothendieck proposed
an axiom that there are arbitrarily large inaccessibles, or equivalently that every set
is contained in a Grothendieck universe. (Actually, this was the first axiom using
universes to be proposed for category theory; only later did Mac Lane observe that
one universe was usually sufficient.) This is still quite a weak large-cardinal axiom.
Note that this use of multiple inaccessibles is different from our discussion of very
large and extremely large categories in §8; here we are changing the size of the
universe, rather than using multiple universes at once.
14One cannot help, however, being reminded of how infinite sets in pre-Cantorian mathematics
were only regarded as ‘potentialities’ rather than completed entities, and how at first even ordinary
large categories were viewed with suspicion. It seems that the trend of mathematical development
is towards recognizing ever larger entities as having an independent existence.
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Now, as long as we haven’t made use of any properties of κ beyond its inacces-
sibility, all our results proven for κ will also be true for our new, larger, κ. This
means that all our theorems implicitly begin with “For any inaccessible κ, . . . ”.
However, the arbitrariness of κ may make us somewhat uneasy. Furthermore, there
is no a priori guarantee that the properties of particular objects will be preserved
by change of universe. For example, suppose that we prove in zfc+i, for some prop-
erty ϕ, that there exists a small group G such that ϕ(G,H) is true for all small
groups H . (The assertion that G is a limit or colimit of some specified diagram in
Grp is of this sort.) This will then be true whether ‘small’ is interpreted relative
to one inaccessible or another, but there is no a priori reason why the group G
with this property need be the same in the two cases. Thus we have no way to
conclude that there is a G satisfying ϕ(G,H) for all groups H . In particular cases
this is obvious; for example, we have explicit ways to compute (small) limits and
colimits in Grp which do not depend on the size of the universe. But the absence
of a general truth of this sort means that care is needed when engaging in such
‘universe-juggling’.
11. Natural models and reflection principles
In an attempt to remedy these problems, let us investigate more specifically
what properties of inaccessibility are really necessary for category theory. The
most important consequence of inaccessibility of κ appears to be that Vκ is a model
of zfc which is itself a set in our assumed larger model V . Thus it is natural to
look more generally at sets which are models of zfc.
Now, a priori a model of zfc consists only of a setM and a relation E ⊂M×M ,
to be interpreted as ‘membership’, such that the axioms of zfc hold. However, we
want the elements of a set inM to be the same as its elements in V , so it is natural
to require that E coincides with the actual membership relation ∈ in V , and that
M is transitive, meaning that x ∈ y ∈ M implies x ∈ M . In fact, any model
is isomorphic to a transitive one, called its (Mostowski) transitive collapse,
via an isomorphism defined inductively by T (x) = {T (y) | yEx}. Thus, nothing
essential is lost by considering only transitive models.
However, pathologies still exist among transitive models. In particular, if there
exists any model of zfc, then there exists one which is transitive and countable—
despite the fact that in zfc one can prove the existence of uncountable sets! This
is known as Skolem’s paradox. The reason is that a set x which is countable in V
may be uncountable to the eyes of M , since the bijection from x to ω may not be
in M .
Skolem’s paradox follows from a model-theoretic result called the Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem theorem. Like Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems and Tarski’s undefinability
theorem, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem also has important philosophical impli-
cations for any axiomatic foundation of mathematics. For this reason, and because
we will re-use the same ideas later, I will now sketch a proof of it.
If ϕ is any statement and M is any structure (that is, a potential model of some
theory, like a group or a universe), let ϕM denote ϕ relativized to M , meaning
that all its quantifiers are restricted to range only over elements of M . If M ⊂ N
we say that ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is reflected from N to M if
∀x1 ∈M · · · ∀xn ∈M
(
ϕN (x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒ ϕ
M (x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
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If all statements ϕ are reflected from N to M , we say that M is an elementary
substructure of N and write M ≺ N ; clearly in this case M is a model of some
theory if and only if N is.
The downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem says that given any structure N and
any infinite S ⊂ N , there exists an M ≺ N such that S ⊂ M and |M | = |S|. To
construct such anM , start withM0 = S. Now, for each statement ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) of
the form ∃y : ψ(y, x1, . . . , xn) and each a1, . . . , an ∈ M0 such that ϕN (a1, . . . , an)
is true, choose some b ∈ N such that ψN (b, a1, . . . , an) is true. Let M1 be M0
together with all such ‘witnesses’ b. Iterate this process to define M2,M3, . . . ,
and let M =
⋃
n∈ωMn. Since there are only countably many statements ϕ, the
cardinality never increases, so |M | = |S|. The only potential difficulty in showing
that M ≺ N is with quantifiers; but we have dealt with existential quantifiers
by construction, while universal ones can be rephrased as the nonexistence of a
counterexample (this is called the Tarski-Vaught test for elementary submodels).
We now obtain Skolem’s paradox by starting with a model N of zfc, applying
this theorem for any countably infinite S ⊂ N (which exists by the axiom of infin-
ity), then taking the transitive collapse of the resulting modelM . Note that in fact
we have proven more: if zfc (or any theory) has a model N , then it has a transitive
model with cardinality κ for all κ ≤ |N |. The upward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem
says that this is also true for κ > |N |.
To avoid Skolem’s paradox, it suffices to require that our transitive model M
of zfc be closed under subsets: x ⊂ y ∈ M implies x ∈ M . This ensures that if
A,B ∈ M and A and B are bijective in V , then the bijection is also in M , since
it is a subset of A× B. A transitive model of zfc closed under subsets is called a
natural model; see [MV59]. It is not difficult to show that any natural model is
of the form Vα for some limit ordinal α.
We have seen that Vα is a natural model when α is inaccessible, but in fact
inaccessibility is much stronger than necessary. Inaccessibility of α asserts, in par-
ticular, that Vα contains the image of any function f : X → Vα such that X ∈ Vα.
But saying that Vα satisfies the replacement schema only asserts this when f is
definable from Vα; that is, when f ∈ Def(Vα). Note that in general any such f
is in Vα+1 = PVα, which contains Def(Vα) as a proper subset. Another way of
expressing this is to say that Vα models zfc if and only if (Vα,Def(Vα)) models
nbg, while (Vα, Vα+1) can only model nbg when α is inaccessible (in which case it
also models mk). To see how nontrivial this distinction is, observe that since there
are only countably many statements ϕ, we have |Def(Vα)| = |Vα|, while of course
|Vα+1| = 2|Vα| > |Vα|.
Remark 11.1. One can also say that if α is inaccessible, then Vα satisfies the second-
order replacement axiom. To understand this we need to describe second-order
logic. The logic we have discussed so far is called first-order logic because variables
and quantifiers only range over ‘things’; in second-order logic they are also allowed
to range over ‘sets of things’. This distinction can be confusing, since for a first-
order theory like zfc the ‘things’ are themselves called ‘sets’.
Second-order logic is more powerful than first-order logic, but suffers from an
ambiguity of interpretation. If by ‘set of things’ we intend to mean any subset of
the model under consideration, then we need an external set theory to define what
is meant by this. This is the sense in which a Grothendieck universe satisfies the
‘second-order replacement axiom’. On the other hand, if we allow the model itself
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to stipulate what ‘sets of things’ exist, then second-order logic reduces to first-order
logic augmented with an extra sort of ‘thing’ called a ‘set of things’. This occurs,
for example, with the replacement axiom of nbg. The existence of natural models
that are not Grothendieck universes shows that this ambiguity has teeth. For this
reason I will continue to stick to first-order logic.
Now, by slightly modifying the proof of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, we can
prove that for any β and S ∈ Vβ , then there is an α ≤ β such that S ∈ Vα and
Vα ≺ Vβ . Namely, instead of a sequence M0 ⊂ M1 ⊂ M2 ⊂ . . . , we construct a
sequence α0 < α1 < α2 < . . . , by letting αn+1 be some ordinal such that all the
witnesses b for Vαn are contained in Vαn+1 . Setting α = limn<ω αn, it follows that
Vα ≺ Vβ . In particular, if Vβ is a natural model, so is Vα.
Of course, in this case there is no guarantee that α 6= β. But if β is inaccessible,
then at the nth stage we need to add only |Vαn | < β witnesses, so we can choose
αn+1 < β; and since β is regular, we then have α < β. A slight improvement of
this proof shows that if β is inaccessible, then
{α < β | Vα is a natural model}
is stationary in β, and in particular has cardinality β. Thus, the existence of natural
models can be regarded as a sort of ‘large cardinal axiom’ significantly weaker than
even a single inaccessible (although α need not actually be a cardinal for Vα to be
a natural model).
It makes intuitive sense that we could also carry through the above argument
using the whole universe V instead of Vβ , and thereby construct a natural model Vα
with Vα ≺ V . Of course, this would prove Con(zfc) and violate the incompleteness
theorem. The flaw in the argument is that with V in place of Vβ , Tarski’s unde-
finability theorem prevents us from defining the set of witnesses b. However, we
can rescue the argument if instead of asserting Vα ≺ V , we only assert that a given
finite set of statements is reflected from V to Vα. This gives a theorem-schema
called the reflection principle: for any finite set ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of statements, we can
prove in zfc that for any set y, there exists an α such that y ∈ Vα and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
are all reflected in Vα.
Now, while the single statement “there exists a natural model” implies the con-
sistency of zfc, the reflection principle suggests a version of it that does not. Let S
be an extra constant symbol, and add to zfc the axiom “S is transitive and closed
under subsets” along with a reflection axiom
∀x1 ∈ S · · · ∀xn ∈ S
(
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) ⇐⇒ ϕ
S(x1, . . . , xn)
)
.
for each statement ϕ. We denote the resulting system by by ZFC/S (“zfc with
smallness”). It follows that for each axiom ϕ of zfc, the relativized version ϕS
is true in zfc/s, so S is a model of zfc. We can also show S = V
k
for some
ordinal k. However, since the proof of each axiom ϕS uses a different instance of
the reflection axiom schema, we cannot prove in zfc/s the single statement “S is
a natural model”.
In fact, we can prove that zfc/s is conservative over zfc. Suppose we have any
theorem which is provable in zfc/s; we show that it can also be proven in zfc.
The original proof, being only finitely long, can only use the reflection schema for
finitely many statements ϕ. Thus, by the reflection principle for zfc, we can find
an α such that all these statements ϕ are reflected in Vα. We can then replace S
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by Vα and carry out the proof in zfc. Note, however, that unlike the proof for
conservativity of nbg, we do not have a way to construct, from a model of zfc, a
model of zfc/s with the same (small) sets.
The theory zfc/s is due to Feferman, who proposed it in [Fef69] as a foundation
for category theory. Of course, we now define small to mean “element of S” and
large to mean “set not necessarily in S”; otherwise things go mostly as before.
Since the axioms of zfc are satisfied for all sets, we can manipulate large sets as
we wish; so we retain that advantage of zfc+i. If we want to talk about very large
and extremely large objects, it is easy to add multiple symbols S1, S2, . . . , each
satisfying reflection and with S1 ∈ S2 ∈ · · · .
However, because zfc/s is conservative over zfc, we have not strengthened our
basic set theory. In particular, anything about small objects that we prove with
the aid of large categories would still be provable in pure zfc. Thus, we obtain a
precise version of our intuition that the use of inaccessibles in category theory is
merely for convenience: since many categorical proofs stated using inaccessibles can
be formalized in zfc/s, any consequence of such a theorem not referring explicitly
to inaccessibles is also provable purely in zfc.
zfc/s also eliminates at least some sources of universe-juggling. For example,
because every statement about sets is reflected in S, anything we prove in zfc/s
about small objects is also true about large objects. In particular, anything we
prove about small categories, even making use of the large category Cat, will also
be true about large categories. Moreover, any property of small objects which refers
only to small objects is retained when reinterpreted to refer to large objects. For
example, the statement that G is a limit of a specified small diagram in the category
Grp of small groups can be expressed as ϕS(G) for some statement ϕ. Thus, the
reflection principle implies that ϕ(G) is also true, and hence G satisfies the same
universal property with respect to large groups.
Whether all universe-juggling can be eliminated in this way depends on our
ontological position towards zfc/s. If we believe that zfc/s is a true representation
of reality—that is, that there actually exists an S satisfying the reflection axioms,
and when working in zfc/s we are making statements about that particular S—then
of course not all objects are small. The reflection principle gives us a precise sense
in which they ‘might as well be’ small, but if we insist on being able to make them
actually small, we would need to augment zfc/s by a Grothendieck-like assumption
of many natural models and continue to engage in universe-juggling.
However, if we instead take the position that zfc is ‘true’, while zfc/s is only a
convenient fiction made possible by the reflection principle, then we can relegate all
the universe-juggling to the ‘behind the scenes’ interpretation of zfc/s in zfc. That
is, we prove all our results in zfc/s, and argue that when we want to apply them to
particular objects in the ‘real world’ of zfc, we tacitly use the reflection principle
to choose some Vα which contains all the objects we happen to be interested in.
Thus the theorems of category theory take on the character of a ‘meta-theory’,
which can be applied to any particular set of objects in the real world by choosing
a sufficiently large Vα containing that set.
Remark 11.2. This seems an appropriate place to mention Ackermann set the-
ory, a theory of sets and classes like nbg and mk which has also been proposed as
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a foundation for category theory. Unlike nbg and mk, however, it allows classes to
be elements of other classes.15 Its axioms are the following.
(i) Extensionality, foundation, and choice.
(ii) Any element or subset of a set is a set.
(iii) For any definable property ϕ(x), if all objects x satisfying ϕ(x) are sets,
then the class {x | ϕ(x)} exists.
(iv) If in the previous axiom, in addition ϕ(x) does not refer explicitly to
sethood (that is, to whether or not any given class is a set), then the class
{x | ϕ(x)} is a set.
These axioms imply (though not obviously) that the class V of all sets is a model
of zfc. Conversely, any model of zfc/s satisfies these axioms if ‘class’ means ‘set’
and ‘set’ means ‘element of S’; see [Le´v59, Rei70]. Thus, like nbg and zfc/s,
Ackermann set theory is a conservative extension of zfc.16 But while it implies a
limited reflection principle, overall it is strictly weaker than zfc/s in what it can
say about its classes. Most of the subsequent remarks about zfc/s apply just as
well to Ackermann set theory.
On the other hand, zfc/s (and likewise Ackermann set theory) is not quite
the paradise it first appears. In order to enable ourselves to manipulate large
objects freely without strengthening set theory, we have been forced to weaken the
replacement axiom for small sets. In both nbg and zfc+i, we have a replacement
axiom saying, essentially, that the image of a small set under a large function is
small. In zfc/s, however, we can only assert this if the large function is small-
definable (that is, in Def(S)). This distinction is invisible to zfc and nbg because
there, all functions are (or might as well be) small-definable, while it is invisible
to mk and zfc+i because their stronger axioms guarantee that all functions with
small domain are small, even those that are not a priori small-definable.
Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that this weakening of replacement has sig-
nificantly annoying consequences for category theory. For example, it implies that
the category Set = Set[S] of small sets need not admit limits and colimits for all
functors F : A → Set when A is small, but only those for which F is also small.
The same is true for other large categories constructed from Set. Similarly, for a
functor u : A→ B between small categories, the functor
[B,Set]
−◦u
−−−→ [A,Set]
will not in general have left and right adjoints (Kan extensions).
On the surface, these restrictions appear quite problematic; the completeness
and cocompleteness of Set is certainly of central importance in category theory.
One way to respond is to assert that in zfc/s, the correct definition of complete is
15This is not obvious from the axioms, which only assert directly the existence of classes whose
elements are sets. To see that there must be classes containing other classes, we observe first that
axiom (iv) implies that sethood cannot be characterized without referring to it explicitly; otherwise
the class V of all sets would be a set. This means that since the property “∃y : x ∈ y” is true of
all sets, it must also be true of some classes; otherwise it would characterize sethood.
16The intuition behind Ackermann set theory, however, is different from that of zfc. Ack-
ermann argued that that the elements of a set must be ‘sharply delimited’, while the elements
of a class, such as V , may depend on how broadly we interpret the concept of ‘set’. Thus, only
properties which do not refer explicitly to sethood are ‘sharply delimited’ enough to define sets.
It is striking that nevertheless, Ackermann’s axioms turned out a posteriori to be equivalent to
zfc in what they can say about sets.
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“having limits for all small functors” rather than “having limits for all functors with
small domain”. Similarly, if we write JA,SetK for the full subcategory of [A,Set]
determined by the small functors, then induced functor
JB,SetK
−◦u
−−−→ JA,SetK
does have both adjoints, and we may assert that in zfc/s, the correct presheaf
category to consider is JA,SetK rather than [A,Set].
Another advantage of JA,SetK is that unlike [A,Set], it is small-definable. This
is a good thing, because in zfc/s, only small-definable categories are at all well-
behaved. For instance, let A be a small set of objects in a locally small and small-
definable category B. We can then prove that
(a) the full subcategory A of B determined by the objects in A is small;
(b) the inclusion functor i : A→ B is small;
(c) for any object X ∈ B, the restricted hom-functor A(i−, X) : Aop → Set
is small; and thus
(d) the restricted Yoneda embeddingB→ [Aop ,Set] factors through JAop ,SetK.
However, there seems to be no way to prove any of these statements if B is not
small-definable. Similarly, theorems like the Adjoint Functor Theorem only seem
to work for small-definable categories.
As observed by Feferman, all this makes little difference in most concrete appli-
cations, because any particular diagram, functor, or category we are interested in
will generally be small-definable (at least, up to equivalence). However, this is not
always trivial to verify; we saw in §8 examples of categories that were equivalent
to small-definable ones, but not obviously. Moreover, small-definability restrictions
are tiresome to keep track of, and some would say unaesthetic as well. In the next
two sections, we will explore two ways to deal with this problem.
12. Strong reflection principles
There is an obvious way to ‘have our cake and eat it too’: we can add to zfc/s
the extra axiom “S is a Grothendieck universe”, or equivalently S = V
k
where k
is inaccessible. For reasons to be explained below, I will call the resulting theory
ZMC/S. It then follows, as in zfc+i, that every functor with small domain is
small, and all small-definability restrictions vanish.
Of course, this may seem like a step backwards, since we began the previous
section by looking for a way to avoid inaccessibles. However, along the way we
discovered the reflection principle, and we saw that the reflection axiom-schema
of zfc/s is really what resolves many of the problems with zfc+i and allows us
to avoid universe-juggling. Since zmc/s retains reflection, all of this is still true,
so the only disadvantage of zfc+i which carries over to zmc/s is that it is not
conservative over zfc.
In fact, zmc/s is significantly stronger than zfc+i, since reflection implies that
k is far from the smallest inaccessible. Namely, since there exists an inaccessible,
there must exist a small inaccessible; but then there exist two inaccessibles, and so
there must exist two small inaccessibles, and so on. By applying reflection to the
statement “there exists an inaccessible larger than α”, in zmc/s we can even derive
Grothendieck’s axiom that there are arbitrarily large inaccessibles.
The same argument that shows zfc/s to be conservative over zfc shows that
zmc/s is conservative over zfc + “any finite set of formulas is reflected in some
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Grothendieck universe.” This stronger reflection principle turns out to be equivalent
to the assertion that any closed unbounded (definable) class of ordinals contains
an inaccessible, which essentially says that the cardinal of the universe is Mahlo
(see [Le´v60]). zfc augmented by this axiom is sometimes called zmc (whence the
notation zmc/s). While rather stronger than the existence of a single inaccessible,
and stronger even than Grothendieck’s axiom, this is still quite weak compared to
many large-cardinal axioms, as we saw in §9.
Moreover, the principle incorporated in zmc is one of the most easily motivated
large-cardinal axioms. For instance, it can be argued that it is a straightforward
expression of the ‘inexhaustibility’ of the universe of sets by any finite number of
operations. Additionally, it is not difficult to show (see [Le´v60]) that in the presence
of the basic axioms only, the reflection principle of zfc implies replacement, power
set, and infinity—all the axioms of zfc which produce larger and larger sets. It
follows that zmc is equivalent to just the basic axioms and choice together with
the schema “any finite set of formulas is reflected in some Grothendieck universe.”
I find this aesthetically quite appealing, because it captures exactly what category
theory seems to need from set theory: we may not be able to have a category of all
sets, but for any particular purpose, we can choose a category of sets large enough
that it might as well contain all of them.
13. Toposes and indexed categories
There is another way to deal with the small-definability issues in zfc/s: we can
use indexed categories, a tool developed to solve a similar problem in elementary
topos theory. Since topos theory is of interest in its own right as a foundation for
mathematics in general, and category theory in particular, we start with a summary
of it. Good introductions to topos theory can be found in [MLM94, McL92a],
while [Joh02] is encyclopedic.
By way of motivation, observe that while zfc suffices as a foundation for most of
mathematics, there is a sense in which it is disconnected from most mathematical
practice. In zfc there is a global membership predicate, meaning that if I give
you two random sets, it makes sense to ask whether one is an element of the
other. However, in actual mathematical practice we usually only speak of local set
membership, meaning that asking whether x ∈ A is only meaningful in the context
of some fixed set B such that x is known to be an element of B and A is known to
be a subset of B. In other words, the way most mathematicians usually think of a
set (or a group, or a topological space, etc.) is as a collection of ‘abstract’ elements
which have no ‘internal’ structure aside from being elements of that set. The only
way that elements of two different sets relate to each other is via functions and
relations between those sets.
Of course, this is a very categorical way of thinking; it is closely related to
the assertion that we only care about objects of a category, such as Set, up to
isomorphism. Thus, it is natural to try to axiomatize the properties of the category
Set, instead of axiomatizing a global membership relation. (While useful, this
motivation for topos theory is ahistorical; see [McL90].) The appropriate axioms
can be classified just as we did for zfc and nbg.
(i) The basic axioms: Set is cartesian closed, has finite limits and colimits,
and the terminal object is a generator.
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(ii) The size-increasing axiom: every object has a ‘power object’ classifying
its subobjects.
(iii) The size-assertion axiom: there is a ‘natural numbers object’.
(iv) The axiom of choice: all epimorphisms split.
An elementary topos17 is a category with finite limits and power objects; this
implies cartesian closedness and the existence of finite colimits. A natural num-
bers object (NNO) in a topos is an object satisfying the universal property
of definition by recursion, or equivalently proof by induction. A topos is well-
pointed if the terminal object 1 is a generator; this means that an object X is
determined by its ‘elements’ x : 1 → X . Thus, a natural axiomatization of Set
is that it is a well-pointed elementary topos with a nno and satisfying the axiom
of choice (a WPTNC). These axioms for Set are also referred to as the Ele-
mentary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS), after Lawvere’s influential
paper [Law64, Law05]. Just as with zfc, it is an empirical observation that much
of mathematics can be developed starting from a model of etcs.
Remark 13.1. In fact, much mathematics can be developed from any elementary
topos (perhaps with a nno), as long as one uses intuitionistic or constructive logic
instead of classical logic. I will return to this point in Remark 15.1.
Notably absent from etcs is any analogue of the axiom of replacement. This
means that if α is any limit ordinal greater than ω, so that Vα satisfies all the
axioms of zfc except replacement, then the category Set[Vα] of sets and functions
in Vα is a wptnc. As remarked in §4, most mathematical objects outside of set
theory have very low rank, living quite comfortably in Vω·2, so this lends extra
credence to the observation that etcs suffices for much of mathematics.
In fact, all one needs to construct a wptnc is a model of Bounded Zermelo
set theory with Choice (BZC), which is zfc without replacement and in which
the properties in the separation axiom are only allowed to have bounded quantifiers
(“for all x ∈ A” rather than just “for all x”). This version of separation is variously
called restricted, bounded, or ∆0-separation. Conversely, from a wptnc one
can construct a model of bzc, although some cleverness is needed to obtain a global
membership predicate; see [MLM94, VI.10] or [Joh77, Ch. 9] for two approaches.
Thus, etcs and bzc are equiconsistent.
I will discuss the implications of etcs and bzc for mathematical practice in more
detail in §14; for now, let us consider their consequences for category theory. We
have seen a hint already of what can go wrong without replacement in our study
of zfc/s, where weakening the replacement axiom created unexpected problems.
To see the more drastic problem we are now faced with, consider the meaning of
the statement “A has small products” when A is a large category. Intuitively, this
means that any X-indexed family of objects of A has a product, for any ‘set’ X .
But what exactly is an “X-indexed family of objects of A”?
In nbg this can mean a class which is a function from X to the class of objects of
A, while in zfc it can mean a definable property ϕ such that for any x ∈ X there
is a unique a ∈ A with ϕ(x, a). In either case, we can then apply the replacement
17There is some controversy about whether the English plural of topos should be toposes or
topoi. The paper by Grothendieck and Verdier which coined the term is in French, where the
plural is again topos; this seems to tell against the Greek plural. However, in English topos also
means “a literary theme or motif”, and in this case the plural used is always topoi. Unfortunately
one cannot avoid making one choice or the other!
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axiom to obtain a set such as {a ∈ A | ∃x ∈ X f(x) = a}, and go on to construct
the product. However, if X is instead an object of an elementary topos S, it is not
at all clear what is even meant by an X-indexed family of objects of A.
On the other hand, any large category A which is constructed from S in any
reasonable way will come with a canonical notion of X-indexed family of objects
for any X ∈ S. To start with, S itself has such a notion: an X-indexed family of
objects of S can be defined to be simply an arrow p : K → X . The intuition is that
an element x ∈ X indexes the fiber p−1(x), but of course objects of the abstract
category S have no ‘elements’ as such. It follows that the category of X-indexed
families of objects of S should be the slice category S/X . We can then extend this
to other categories of ‘sets with structure’. For example, if A is the category of
‘small groups’, meaning internal group objects in S, then an X-indexed family of
objects of A should be an internal group object in S/X .
Thus, when doing category theory relative to an elementary topos S, it is natural
to consider, instead of a single categoryA, a family of categoriesAX for each object
X ∈ S, where AX is thought of as the category of ‘X-indexed families of objects
of A’. Of course, these categories should be related in some way as X varies, and
it turns out that the important property is the ability to reindex a family: if K
is an X-indexed family and f : Y → X , then we have a Y -indexed family f∗K.
The intuition is that for y ∈ Y we have (f∗K)y = Kf(y). For S and categories
constructed from it, this reindexing is given by pullback along f .
With this as motivation, we define an S-indexed category A to consist of
a category AX for each object X ∈ S, together with a functor f∗ : AX → AY
for each arrow f : Y → X in S, and natural isomorphisms (gf)∗ ∼= f∗g∗ and
IdAX ∼= (1X)
∗ satisfying obvious axioms.18 An S-indexed category can also be
described by assembling the categories AX into a single category
∮
A equipped
with a functor
∮
A→ S assigning a family to its indexing object; in this form it is
called a (categorical) fibration over S. Good introductions to indexed categories
and fibrations can be found in [Joh02, Part B] and [Str].
If we now replace our na¨ıve large category A by an S-indexed category, all
problems disappear. For example, we can define A to have S-indexed products if
each reindexing functor f∗ : AX → AY has a right adjoint (plus a commutativity
condition). For a more general notion of completeness, we need a notion of ‘small
category’, and the obvious candidate is an internal category in S, which consists of
objects C0, C1 ∈ S with arrows s, t : C1 ⇉ C0, i : C0 → C1, and c : C1×C0 C1 → C1
satisfying obvious axioms. Any internal category C gives rise to an S-indexed
category C with CX = S(X,C•), and we can define a C-diagram in any S-indexed
category A to be an object F ∈ AC0 together with a morphism s∗F → t∗F in AC1
satisfying suitable axioms. The appropriate notions of limit and completeness are
then fairly straightforward.19 Similarly, we can define local smallness, generators,
and well-poweredness, and state and prove an Indexed Adjoint Functor Theorem.
We saw that S itself is represented by the S-indexed category with SX = S/X ;
we call this the self-indexing of S. It turns out that the self-indexing is always
18The 2-categorically sophisticated reader may call this a pseudofunctor Sop → CAT . This is
fine as long as we have some external set theory with which to define a 2-category CAT of large
enough categories.
19This is not quite true; I am omitting some details in an attempt to give the flavor of the
subject without getting bogged down. See the references above for a careful treatment.
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complete and cocomplete, in the indexed sense, for any elementary topos S. In par-
ticular, this applies to Set[Vα] for any limit ordinal α, even though such toposes are
not complete and cocomplete in the na¨ıve ‘external’ sense. For example, Set[Vω·2]
fails to have the coproduct
∐
n<ω iω+n, even though it contains ω and each iω+n.
But this does not violate indexed cocompleteness, since
{
iω+n
}
n∈ω
is not an ω-
indexed family in the self-indexing of Set[Vω·2]: if there were such a family K → ω,
then K would have to essentially already be the desired coproduct.
The situation may be clarified by observing that there is a different indexed
category over any S = Set[Vα] called the na¨ıve indexing, for which S
X
na¨ıve is the
category of all functions X → Vα. The self-indexing of Set[Vα] embeds in its na¨ıve
indexing, and the two are equivalent precisely when α is inaccessible. In between
the two we have the definable indexing, for which SXdef is the category of all
definable functions X → Vα. This agrees with the self-indexing whenever Vα is a
natural model. Neither the na¨ıve indexing nor the definable indexing of Set[Vω·2] is
complete or cocomplete, nor is the na¨ıve indexing of Set[Vα] when Vα is a natural
model that is not a Grothendieck universe; but the self-indexing of either always is.
In fact, if V is any model of bzc, then the resulting well-pointed topos Set[V ]
has both a self-indexing and a definable indexing, and the assertion that V satisfies
replacement (hence is a model of zfc) is equivalent to the assertion that these two
indexings agree. To define a ‘na¨ıve indexing’, our universe V must live inside a
larger universe of sets or classes, such as a model of nbg, mk, or zfc+i. In each
of these cases, the version of replacement asserted implies that the resulting na¨ıve
indexing is actually equivalent to the self-indexing as well.
We can now see that when working with large categories in zfc, we have implic-
itly been using the definable indexing, while in nbg, mk, and zfc+i we have been
using the na¨ıve indexing. Topos theory suggests that actually, the self-indexing is
always the ‘correct’ indexing to use, and the role of the replacement axiom is to
ensure that the self-indexing is equivalent to the definable or na¨ıve indexings, which
are more intuitive and easier to work with. See [Str, §17] for further discussion of
‘internal’ versus ‘external’ completeness.
Now let us return to zfc/s. Since S is a natural model20 but not a Grothendieck
universe, the self-indexing of Set[S] agrees with its definable indexing, but not its
na¨ıve indexing. Moreover, the objects of SXself = S
X
def = S/X are essentially the same
as the small functions X → S; thus indexed completeness of Set[S] agrees with our
proposed ad hoc redefinition of completeness in §11. More generally, any small-
definable category in zfc/s gives rise to a Set[S]-indexed category containing only
the small X-indexed families of objects, and the machinery of indexed categories
automatically keeps track of all the restrictions we had to impose by hand in §11.
For example, if C is an internal category C in Set[S], the category of C-diagrams
in Sself is the well-behaved JC,SetK rather than the poorly-behaved [C,Set].
Thus, one may say that the problems we encountered with zfc/s arose due to
our trying to use the na¨ıve indexing in a situation where our replacement axiom was
only sufficient to deal with the definable indexing. Moreover, Feferman’s hypothesis
that zfc/s suffices for basic category theory now follows from the observation that
most theorems of basic category theory have indexed analogues.
20However, remember that “S is a natural model” is not a single theorem of zfc/s, but a
schema consisting of one theorem for each axiom of zfc.
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On the other hand, once we are willing to use indexed categories, we do not
necessarily need to to assume a replacement axiom at all in order to do category
theory. Thus, we could choose any wptnc S which is a set, even Set[Vω·2], define
a small category to mean an internal category in S and a large category to mean an
S-indexed category, and develop category theory that way. This way we can remain
completely within zfc (or even something much weaker), and Grothendieck’s axiom
of arbitrarily large inaccessibles can be replaced by the simple fact that any set is
contained in some Vα.
However, the machinery of indexed categories is admittedly rather complicated,
and it seems unreasonable to expect most users of category theory to be familiar
with it when there are so many simpler foundational options available. If nothing
else, though, indexed categories give a more conceptual understanding of the small-
definability restrictions arising in zfc/s. (Of course, indexed categories are also
crucial when working with a general elementary topos, rather than a wptnc.)
14. Aside: the strength of categorical set theory
Let us pause here briefly to compare the ‘category-theoretic foundation’ for math-
ematics offered by etcs and its relatives with the ‘set-theoretic foundation’ offered
by zfc and its cousins. This terminology is common, but one can also argue per-
suasively (see [Law05]) that etcs is itself a set theory, meaning a theory about the
behavior of sets. What distinguishes it from zfc is not its objects of study, but
how it studies them: by taking functions as a basic notion rather than global mem-
bership. Perhaps a more correct distinction would be to call etcs a categorical21
set theory and zfc a membership set theory.
I mentioned in §13 that etcs is equiconsistent with bzc. In fact, if we add
axioms to etcs and bzc saying that every set is contained in a transitive one
and that transitive collapses exist (§11), then we can obtain a full equivalence
between models of the two theories; see [Joh77, Ch. 9] or [Osi74]. These additional
axioms can be proven in zfc using replacement, but are much weaker than it; in
particular, adding them does not change the consistency strength of etcs and bzc.
This altered version of bzc is sometimes called Mac Lane set theory (MAC).
Thus, at least in one sense, etcs and bzc/mac are completely equivalent.
However, as I argued in §13, etcs may seem closer to most mathematical prac-
tice than bzc, since it discards the usually superfluous notion of global member-
ship. Furthermore, in line with the observed fact that most mathematicians only
care about objects up to isomorphism, etcs can only characterize any set up to
isomorphism; see [McL93]. Even a lot of notions in set theory, including many
large-cardinal axioms, are invariant under isomorphism.
On the other hand, etcs and bzc are both significantly weaker than zfc: not
only are they missing the replacement axiom, but they only allow separation for
formulas with bounded quantification. This implies that just as nbg can only prove
mathematical induction for statements not quantifying over classes, bzc can only
prove induction for statements without unbounded quantifiers. For example, ifA is
a large category in the style of §6, then a statement such as “for all n, A has n-fold
21There is an unfortunate collision between the common and natural use of ‘categorical’ to
mean ‘related to categories’, and the much older philosophical and logical tradition in which
‘categorical’ means ‘absolute’ or ‘uniquely determined’. This has led some authors to use categorial
for the former notion.
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products” involves unbounded quantifiers and thus cannot be proven by induction
in bzc or etcs, at least not obviously.
The axiom of replacement also has other uses outside of set theory, usually
taking the form of transfinite induction arguments. The classic example is Borel
determinacy in descriptive set theory, which is known to be unprovable even in
Zermelo set theory (that is, zfc without replacement but with full separation).
Closer to home for us are transfinite constructions such as Example 4.4, which also
require some form of replacement. For instance, the power-set functor cannot be
iterated even ω times without replacement, since |Pωω| = iω 6∈ Vω·2. The same is
true of the dual-vector-space functor. For a very detailed study of the strength of
bzc and its cousins, see [Mat01].
For these reasons, it is natural to wonder whether etcs can be strengthened
with versions of full separation and replacement to obtain a categorical set theory
equivalent in strength to zfc. In fact, it suffices to consider replacement, since at
least with classical logic, replacement implies full separation. There has not been
a lot of work in this area, but several sorts of categorical replacement-type axioms
have been proposed.
The perspective of §13 suggests that perhaps a categorical replacement axiom
should essentially say “the definable indexing of Set agrees with the self-indexing”.
In constructing the definable indexing of Set[V ] we used the fact that our sets have
elements, but in a well-pointed topos we can replace these elements by morphisms
1→ X . Thus, we say a well-pointed topos S satisfies replacement if for any object
X and any definable property ϕ(x, S) such that for any ‘element’ x : 1 → X there
exists a object Sx unique up to isomorphism with ϕ(x, Sx), there exists a morphism
S → X such that for any x there is a pullback square
Sx //

S

1 x
// X.
This version of replacement is from [McL04]; other similar ones can be found
in [Osi74, Law05]. These references also prove that etcs plus replacement is equiv-
alent to zfc, in the strong sense of an equivalence of models. Thus, if all we want
is a categorical set theory equivalent to zfc, we have it.
On the other hand, these axioms of replacement are not fully satisfactory from
a categorical point of view, because they all depend heavily on well-pointedness.
As mentioned previously, all the other axioms of etcs make perfect sense without
well-pointedness, and much mathematics can be developed from any elementary
topos; thus it would be nice to have a version of the replacement axiom that makes
sense without well-pointedness.
In [Tay99, Ch. 9] Paul Taylor proposed an axiom he called the categorical ax-
iom of iterative replacement, which asserts directly the possibility of transfinite
constructions on functors. This axiom makes sense without well-pointedness, but
seemingly has not been investigated in very much detail. I do not know of any more
explicitly replacement-like axioms that make sense for non-well-pointed toposes.
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15. Algebraic set theory
The categorical set theories we have considered so far are analogues of zfc; in
this section we consider categorical analogues of nbg and zfc+i. One motivation
for this is to find a more categorical way to state the replacement axiom; another
is to find an easier way to deal with large categories.
We saw in §13 that one appropriate notion of a large category with respect to
an elementary topos is an indexed category. As for na¨ıve large categories in zfc,
the elementary theory of indexed categories suffices when we only need to consider
them one at a time. However, if we want to quantify over indexed categories (such
as in proving the Adjoint Functor Theorem), perform constructions on them, or
assemble them into a larger category (or a 2-category), we need to assume some
sort of external set theory. This is automatic if our topos S is the category of small
sets in zfc/s or zfc+i—though in the latter case there is little need for indexed
categories.
A more categorical approach is to introduce a category of classes C which con-
tains the topos S of sets and also other large categories. This is a recent area of
active research known as algebraic set theory; good introductions are [Awo, JM95].
The usual approach is to equip C with a collection S of small morphisms, the in-
tuition being that a morphism is small when it has small fibers. Different authors
choose slightly different axioms on C and S, but in general they can be classified
as follows.
(i) C has finite limits and colimits, and some additional level of structure
allowing at least the interpretation of finitary logic.
(ii) Small maps are closed under composition, pullback, descent, and other
basic constructions.
(iii) Every objectX ofC has a powerclass PsX classifying its small subobjects.
(iv) There is a universal object U of C which ‘contains all small objects’.
I will refer to some suitable version of these axioms collectively as Algebraic Set
Theory (AST). As with the elementary topos axioms, the axioms of ast can be
augmented by well-pointedness, choice, and existence of a nno.
We define an object X ∈ C to be small if X → 1 is a small map. Any model of
nbg gives rise to a model of ast in which the small objects are the sets. Conversely,
the axioms of ast imply that the category S of small objects is an elementary topos,
which inherits well-pointedness, choice, and a nno from C. Moreover, as long as
C is well-pointed, the wptnc S also satisfies replacement, in the sense described
in §14. We may not quite get a model of nbg by taking the objects of C to be
the classes, since some of them may be too large (violating limitation of size), but
in practice, working in ast with well-pointedness, choice, and a (small) nno is
essentially equivalent to working in nbg.
Note that just as in a topos, the internal logic of C is restricted to bounded
quantifiers. However, now we can interpret ‘unbounded’ quantifiers ranging over
all small objects by using bounded quantifiers ranging over the universal object U .
This gives a categorical explanation of why comprehension in nbg is restricted to
formulas that only quantify over sets.
If we assume in addition that C is itself a topos, as in [Str05], then we obtain a
theory equivalent to what one might call bzc+i. Adding a replacement schema for
C, as described in §14, brings us up to zfc+i. In all cases, we can define a large
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category to be an internal category inC and a small category to be one in S, and the
development of category theory then mirrors what happens in the corresponding
membership set theory. (We could also use C to perform constructions on S-
indexed categories, but since S satisfies replacement with respect to C there seems
little need for the extra complication.)
There are many other beautiful aspects to algebraic set theory, of which I will
only mention one: the cumulative hierarchy V =
⋃
Vα and the class Ω of ordinals
can be defined by universal properties. Define a ZF-algebra to be a partially
ordered class A which has suprema of all small families and is equipped with a
‘successor’ operation s : A → A. The class V of all sets, ordered by inclusion and
with s(x) = {x}, can then be proven to be the initial ZF-algebra. The class Ω of
ordinals is also a ZF-algebra with s(α) = α+1, so we have a unique homomorphism
of ZF-algebras ρ : V → Ω; this turns out to be essentially the rank function. The
function Ω → V sending α to Vα can be characterized by an analogous universal
property, or as a right adjoint to ρ; see [JM95] for details.
Remark 15.1. So far I have focused exclusively on well-pointed categorical set the-
ories with choice, because they are the most relevant to a mathematician looking
for a categorical substitute for zfc. As noted in Remark 13.1, however, much of
the independent interest of topos theory comes from the fact that any elementary
topos has an internal set-like logic, and in general this internal logic is not classi-
cal logic but constructive logic. Well-pointedness and choice are each quite special
properties of a topos, and both independently imply that its logic is classical.
Much of mathematics can be developed using constructive logic, although many
classical definitions and results must be rephrased carefully to obtain a construc-
tively meaningful or useful form. For example, Tychonoff’s theorem that the prod-
uct of compact spaces is compact is true constructively, without the axiom of choice,
but the definition of space has to be modified; see [Joh02, Part C]. Classical concepts
also often bifurcate into two or more inequivalent constructive ones. For example,
there are at least three different kinds of constructive ordinals with slightly different
properties; see [JM95, Tay96].
Most relevantly for us, the axiom of replacement loses much of its power con-
structively: it no longer implies unbounded separation, Borel determinacy, or the
usual sort of transfinite induction. Moreover, the categorical replacement axiom
from §13 is no longer sensible in the non-well-pointed case, and it is an open ques-
tion whether it has some more general analogue.
Algebraic set theory, like elementary topos theory, makes perfect sense (and is
usually studied) without well-pointedness, but its version of replacement is also
much weaker constructively. In fact, any elementary topos S can be embedded as
the topos of small objects in a category C of classes, but the logic of C will not in
general be classical even if that of S is; thus every topos ‘satisfies replacement’ in
a constructive sense. This is analogous to the use of indexed categories to ‘define
away’ the lack of replacement by considering only small families to begin with. The
interested reader can learn more about constructive logic in toposes and ast from
the references cited above.
16. Higher categories
One can envision more radically ‘categorical’ foundations. For instance, it is
hard to deny that in everyday mathematics we very rarely care about large sets as
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sets—we only care about them insofar as they form the class of objects of some
large category. In particular, we only care about their elements up to isomorphism.
Thus, in a sense, the ‘large’ collections which arise naturally in mathematics be-
have fundamentally differently than the ‘small’ ones. This distinction is captured
elegantly by the theory of indexed categories, which gives an analogue of large
categories without making use of a prior notion of large set.
Analogously, we generally only care about large categories up to equivalence,
and thus we should regard them as objects of a 2-category CAT , rather than of a
category CAT. This seems to suggest that instead of axiomatizing the category
of classes, a more categorical generalization of elementary toposes would be to
axiomatize the 2-category of large categories. Notable steps have been made in this
direction (see [Str74, Web07]), but I think it is fair to say that a fully satisfactory
answer has not yet emerged. Since this approach also requires a good deal of
familiarity with 2-categories, I will not attempt to explain it further here.
Of course, once we start to study 2-categories, we need to assemble them into 3-
categories, and so on ad infinitum. Philosophical and mathematical remarks along
these lines can be found in [Mak98], among other places.
17. Conclusion
We have explored many possible foundations for category theory, including:
(1) A na¨ıve approach which remains within zfc.
(2) Introducing classes as objects, as in nbg and mk.
(3) Using an inaccessible to distinguish small sets from large ones (zfc+i).
(4) Using a reflection principle, perhaps combined with inaccessibles, as in
zfc/s and zmc/s.
(5) Categorical versions of the above, using toposes (etcs) or categories of
classes (ast).
Each has advantages and disadvantages, and I do not mean to put one forward
as the correct foundation for category theory; I leave that choice to the reader’s
aesthetic and mathematical judgment.
Instead, let me end by reiterating that for the basic theorems of category theory,
the choice of foundation is essentially irrelevant. Each of the above proposals deals
with the distinction between small and large in a way which is fully satisfactory
for proving results such as the Adjoint Functor Theorem (except that in some
cases we have to state it as a meta-theorem, or add small-definability restrictions).
However, as we have seen, the choice of foundation does matter for some more
elaborate constructions. Thus, I believe it is important for students and users of
category theory to have some familiarity with its possible foundations, and I hope
to have partially addressed that need here.
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